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I.

INTRODUCTION

The President is not only the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces of the United States—he or she serves at the pinnacle of the
military’s chain-of-command, and the nation’s military forces are
subject to his or her orders.1 As Commander-in-Chief, control over the
military includes the authority to place the military around the world and
have its servicemembers conform to other presidential authorities in the
arenas of foreign policy, national security, and certain domestic policy.2
For the first time in over a century, a President has confidently intruded
into a court-martial, not merely to the detriment of the accused
servicemember—Robert Bowe Bergdahl—but also in a manner that is
* Joshua E. Kastenberg is a professor at the University of New Mexico, School of Law.
Prior to joining the law school faculty, he was commissioned through the Air Force ROTC and
served as an officer and judge advocate in the United States Air Force for over twenty years. In
finishing this Article, Professor Kastenberg thanks Professor Rachel VanLandingham at the
Southwestern Law School as well as Dean Sergio Pareja at the University of New Mexico School of
Law.
1. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution reads in full:
The President shall be Commander[-]in[-]Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615-16 (1850). In
Federalist 69, Hamilton wrote that the President as Commander-in-Chief is “nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Fleming, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 615-16.

11

12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:11

deleterious to a basic constitutional foundation recognized at the nation’s
founding: the prevention of tyranny through the subordination of the
military to both the civil government and the laws governing the
military.3 Although Congress should expressly prohibit the type of
intrusion which has occurred in Bergdahl’s case, the federal judiciary, as
well as the military courts, must assess claims of presidential unlawful
command influence (and that of senior civil officers in the military
establishment) by considering the historic underpinnings of the
prohibition against unlawful command influence as well as the nation’s
military law history which is rooted, in part, in the fear of standing
armies.
In 1827, in Martin v. Mott,4 Associate Justice Joseph Story, in
writing the Court’s opinion regarding military jurisdiction over state
militia when ordered into federal military service, penned, “While
subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider whether they
ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts
upon which the Commander-in-Chief exercises the right to demand their
services, the hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the means
of resistance.”5 Yet, Justice Story also dichotomously reminded the
nation that “[a] free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of
military power.”6 Justice Story’s comment on this point is perhaps best
reflected by the fact that historically, with the exception of wartime,
courts-martial could not be used to prosecute soldiers for common
crimes when they occurred within state jurisdiction as a matter of
distrusting military trials.7 In point of fact, the 1806 Articles of War
governing courts-martial made it an offense for a commanding officer to
neglect the duty of strict adherence to the narrow jurisdictional limits of
courts-martial by failing to ensure that soldiers accused of crimes were
brought into civil court.8 Moreover, it is clear that the nation’s founders
3. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 715-17 (1993).
4. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id. at 29. In Wise v. Withers, the Court made clear that citizens who, by virtue of their
office, were statutorily exempted from militia duty, could not be court-martialed as such persons
were not amenable to military jurisdiction. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 331, 337 (1806).
7. See Articles of War, ch. 20, art. 33, 2 Stat. 359, 364 (1806) (requiring commanding
officers “to deliver over such accused person, or persons, to the civil magistrate”). On the early
American Army see, for example, GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 339-43, 589 (3d ed. 1915).
8. Article 33 concludes:
If any commanding officer, or officers, shall willfully neglect, or shall refuse, upon the
application aforesaid, to deliver over such accused person, or persons, to the civil
magistrates, or to be aiding and assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending such
person, or persons, the officer, or officers, so offending, shall be cashiered.
See Art. 33, 2 Stat. at 364.
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sought to minimize presidential authority over courts-martial through
reliance on militia control of courts-martial when called to federal duty.9
Justice Story’s observation on the exercise and restraint of military
power is applicable in viewing how Congress and the courts assess
President Donald Trump’s interactions with military justice, including
his pardons and eviscerations of the courts-martial in cases involving
servicemembers accused of “war crime-type” offenses.10 His conduct in
those cases, which has benefitted servicemembers who acted contrary to
the laws of war, illuminate the gravity of his “unlawful command
influence” in the court-martial in United States v. Bergdahl,11 if, for no
other reason, because of the early fears of a standing army. This is all the
more important because the Constitution’s framers sought to limit the
ability of a President to become a tyrant by diffusing control over the
Army in at least two ways applicable to the issue of unlawful command
influence.12 First, the standing army was designed as a small force with
state militias as the larger military.13 Secondly, the jurisdiction of Army
courts-martial was narrowly tailored to strictly military offenses when
held in the states.14
Two opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court in the
1950s highlight fears of an expansive military justice system under
9. See, for example, Section 6 of the Militia Act of 1795, which reads: “And be it further
enacted, That courts martial for the trial of militia shall be composed of militia officers only.”
Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 6, 1 Stat. 424 (1795). Congressional reluctance to empower the
President over courts-martial continued into the Civil War. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 941, 1017-18 (2008).
10. On November 15, 2019, President Trump exercised his constitutional authority and
granted pardons to two servicemembers—one accused of, and the other convicted of, offenses
properly labeled as war crimes. See Dave Philipps, Trump’s Pardons for War Crimes Stir Unease in
Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2019, at 22. He also restored the rank of a third service member
convicted of a war crime. See Idrees Ali, Trump Pardons Army Officers, Restores Navy SEAL’s
Rank
in
War
Crimes
Cases,
REUTERS
(Nov.
15,
2019,
6:57
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-warcrimes-pardon/trump-pardons-army-officers-resto
res-navy-seals-rank-in-war-crimes-cases-idUSKBN1XP2G4. The President earlier pardoned a
convicted war criminal soldier in May 2019. See Bill Chappell, Trump Pardons Michael Behenna,
Former Soldier Convicted of Killing Iraqi Prisoner, NPR (May 7, 2019, 10:17 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/07/720967513/trump-pardons-former-soldier-convicted-ofkilling-iraqprisoner. President Trump also chastised Navy judge advocates serving as prosecutors, and revoked
the military medals awarded to them following the court-martial of a Navy SEAL convicted of war
crimes, after pardoning the servicemember. See Peter Baker, Trump Tells Navy to Strip Medals from
Prosecutors in War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2019, at A18.
11. See United States v. Bergdahl, 79 M.J. 512 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2019).
12. See, e.g., WALTER MILLIS, ARMS AND MEN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY
47-49 (1956).
13. On the small size of the first post-Constitution standing army and the historic reliance on
militia, see generally JOHN R. MAASS, DEFENDING A NEW NATION 1783-1811 (U.S. Army Ctr. of
Mil. Hist. ed. 2013).
14. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13-15, 23 (1955).
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presidential control. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,15 the Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Hugo Black, noted, “There are dangers
lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of
Rights and Article III of our Constitution.” 16 Quarles dealt with the
question of whether former, non-retired servicemembers remained
subject to military jurisdiction.17 In Reid v. Covert,18 an opinion arising
from a challenge to the military’s jurisdiction over civilians residing on
United States military bases overseas, the Court held that narrowing
military jurisdiction to servicemembers was necessary to “[t]he tradition
of keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority.” 19 It is a
reasonable observation that a President who subverts the current military
law construct risks imperiling this critical constitutional tradition.
The prohibition against unlawful command influence over military
trials is a check against a President’s arbitrary exertion of power. This
Article argues that in assessing the dangers of presidential unlawful
command influence, in light of the current executive branch’s conduct
over military justice, the federal legislative and judicial branches, as well
as the judiciary of the military justice system, must take into account the
President’s vast authority—not only to ensure fair military trials, but
also as a means to protect the nation’s democratic institutions.20
Although most of the case law on unlawful command influence comes
from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) and its
predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals, as well as from the service
courts of appeal, there is worthy precedent in both the Supreme Court’s
late nineteenth and early twentieth century opinions and through a
deeper understanding of the nation’s military legal history.21 Such an
15. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
16. Id. at 22.
17. For a background on Quarles, see JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG & ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME
OF TOTAL WAR: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE - 1940-1954, at 236-37
(2016).
18. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
19. Id. at 23, 40.
20. See infra Parts III, IV.D.
21. Established by Congress in 1950, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”)
has five judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate. 10 U.S.C.
§ 942. Unlike Article III judges, judges appointed to the CAAF serve for fifteen-year terms. Id. The
court resides in the Department of Defense as an Article I Court and is limited to strict questions of
law and appeals within its governing statutes. Id. §§ 867, 941; see also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526
U.S. 529, 531 (1999) (prohibiting use of the All Writs Act to enjoin the President from “dropping
[an officer] from the rolls”). As civilian judges, this Article does not argue that the CAAF is subject
to unlawful command influence. However, the Department of Defense and the President have a duty
not to coercively interfere in the internal functions. See, e.g., Mundy v. Weinberger, 554 F. Supp.
811, 821-22 (D.D.C. 1982).
Below the CAAF are the service courts of appeal. Established by Congress, any
servicemember who receives a sentence of six months or a punitive discharge is entitled to review
by these courts. See 10 U.S.C. § 866. There are four such courts: the United States Army Court of
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understanding can be obtained through a historic approach relying not
merely on case law, but also relevant primary source material.
This Article is divided into three main Parts, each with an analysis
of the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and military
justice. Part II briefly defines unlawful command influence and then
presents an overview of unlawful command influence prior to 1950,
featuring one instance of presidential influence which, under Article 37,
would amount to the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.22 Part II is
divided into three Subparts. The first Subpart details one application of
the prohibition of courts-martial prior to 1950 and juxtaposes the
prohibition against questionable and unpopular, but not illegal,
presidential actions.23 The second Subpart presents restraints on
monarchal control over English and Dutch courts-martial predating the
Constitution and argues that these historic restraints are persuasive to
shaping United States military law, if for no other reason than for the
protection of democratic institutions.24 Included in this Subpart are
recognized presidential authorities over the military.25 The third Subpart
focuses on a historically flawed reliance on Swaim v. United States,26 a
decision issued in 1897, which, unfortunately, has been used as a basis
to uphold presidential authority without judicial oversight and other
means of restraint.27
Part III of the Article presents a legal history of three pre-Uniform
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) Court opinions for the purpose of
showing the existence of judicially recognized constitutional restraints
against Commander-in-Chief influence over courts-martial.28 These
opinions—Runkle v. United States,29 McClaughry v. Deming,30 and
Grafton v. United States31—present historic evidence that there has been
Criminal Appeals; the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals; the United
State Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals; and the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 653 (1997). The judges serving on these
courts are usually military officers appointed by the judge advocate generals of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. See § 866. In terms of the Coast Guard, the Secretary of Transportation is vested
with the appointment authority. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 656. Moreover, the Court has enabled the
appointment of civilians to the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 653-54, 666.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part III. Additionally, it was not until after World War II that a court-martial
could include an enlisted member to serve as a “juror.” See Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169, 176 (1953).
29. 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
30. 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
31. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).

16

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:11

an acceptance as to restraints against Commander-in-Chief influence
over courts-martial as well as an understanding of the effects of such
limits on the broader scope of Commander-in-Chief authorities over the
military.32
Part IV compares President Trump’s conduct with the rectitude of
past administrations as a matter of lex non scripta.33 Defined as an
unwritten law found in custom, lex non scripta remains a source of
military law.34 Finally, the Article concludes with the argument that
President Trump’s conduct over military justice presents, for the first
time in the nation’s history, the type of Commander-in-Chief exertions
that are antithetical to the military’s constitutional place in the nation.35
II.

UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE AND THE SKIRTING OF
MILITARY LEGAL HISTORY

Unlawful command influence has long been considered “the mortal
enemy of military justice.”36 The phrase “mortal enemy of military
justice” does not, to be sure, explain what unlawful command influence
is under the United States’ military laws, or capture that a de facto
prohibition against a chain-of-command undermining the fairness of
courts-martial predates the UCMJ. Nor does the phrase note the impact
of unlawful command influence on the United States Constitution,
particularly in terms of overarching executive branch authority. Since
the UCMJ’s enactment in 1950, the prohibition against unlawful
command influence has centered around the conduct of senior uniformed
military personnel and how this conduct may erode an accused
servicemember’s right to a fair trial.37 Indeed, from the time of its
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 42 (2d ed. 1896). As defined
by Winthrop, the military’s lex non scripta consists of “the customs of the service,” and “the
unwritten laws and customs of war.” Id.; see also United States v. Pitasi, 20 C.M.A. 601, 606
(1971). Winthrop maintained the importance of military law throughout the Articles of War and
courts-martial procedures. See, e.g., JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY
LAW: COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP 237-38 (Martin Gordon ed., 2009).
35. See infra Part V.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (first quoting United
States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2004); and then quoting United States v. Thomas, 22
M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986)).
37. For an example of the reasoning behind the prohibition, see United States v. Littrice, 3
C.M.A. 487, 490-91 (1953). In this decision, the (then) Court of Military Appeals quoted, in
pertinent part, from a 1948 Report of the Committee on Military Justice of the New York County
Lawyers Association to the Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee:
The system of military justice laid down in the Manual for Courts Martial not
infrequently broke down because of the denial to the courts of independence of action in
many instances by the commanding officers who appointed the courts and reviewed their
judgments; and who conceived it the duty of command to interfere for disciplinary
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creation, one of the UCMJ’s fundamental goals was to eradicate
unlawful command influence over military trials.38
Article 37 of the UCMJ prohibits a convening authority or other
senior officer and non-commissioned officers from coercively
interfering with an accused servicemember’s right to a fair trial.39 The
military’s judicial focus on fair trial rights makes perfect sense since,
after all, a court-martial is a trial of a servicemember, and the
servicemember has the right to a fair trial.40 One of the aspects of a
court-martial that distinguishes it from a state or federal criminal trial is
that within the unique structure of the military, servicemembers who
serve as witnesses, military judges, and as “jurors,” are subject to the
direct orders as well as subtle influences of a chain-of-command.41
Congress determined that, following the experiences of tens of
thousands of courts-martial in the preceding two world wars and Civil
War, some type of safeguard was necessary and crafted Article 37 in
response.42 Indeed, in World War II, courts-martial comprised one-third
purposes.
Id. at 491. The Court continued: “While it struck a compromise, Congress expressed an intent to
free courts-martial members from any improper and undue influence by commanders which might
affect an honest and conscientious consideration of the guilt or innocence of an accused.” Id.
38. United States v. Cole, 38 C.M.R. 94, 95 (C.M.A. 1967). In Cole, the court held:
One of the basic objectives of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is to eradicate this
misuse of command power, but unfortunately total success has not yet been realized.
Perhaps it never will be because of the vagaries of human nature. This Court, however, is
dedicated to the Code’s objective to protect the court-martial processes from improper
command influence.
Id. at 95.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 837 reads, in pertinent part:
No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial, nor any other
commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member,
military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by
the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the
proceeding. No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal
or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of
any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts.
40. See Morgan, supra note 28, at 183-84.
41. See, e.g., Luther C. West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial
System, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9, 14, 19 (1970); Morgan, supra note 28, at 183-84. In a court-martial,
the term “member” is used in place of “juror.” There are distinct differences between a member and
a juror. A member is selected by the general court-martial convening authority. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 825; United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 356 (C.A.A.F. 2011). No member serving on a
court-martial may be inferior in rank to the accused servicemember on trial unless such cannot be
avoided. Gooch, 69 M.J. at 357-58.
42. See, e.g., Rachel E. VanLandingham, Military Due Process: Less Military & More
Process, 94 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18-19, 24 (2019). In point of fact, one of the notable aspects of Article
37 is that it prohibits an admonishment of law officers. See id. at 27. It was not until 1968 when
Congress mandated that general court-martial have an independent military judge. See, e.g., Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1994).
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of all criminal trials held in United States courts.43 On the other hand, as
Professor Rachel VanLandingham points out, not once in the
seventy-year history of Article 37 has any violator been prosecuted in a
court-martial.44 Finally, the efficiency, reliability, and discipline of the
military rely on the prevention of unlawful command influence to a
degree broader than courts-martial.45 The prohibition against unlawful
command influence also extends into administrative procedures.46
For the purpose of this Article, it is unnecessary to examine the full
range of unlawful command influence actions in focusing on presidential
conduct such as has occurred in Bergdahl’s case. To effectively do so, it
is critical to note certain prohibited actions amounting to unlawful
command influence. Coercive methods arising to unlawful command
influence include both general policy statements in which a command
makes clear that it wants particularized results in courts-martial, as well
as command statements pointing out what should occur to a specific
servicemember.47 Harassment of a military judge also may give rise to
unlawful command influence.48 This includes admonishing a military
43. See Delmar Karlen & Louis H. Pepper, The Scope of Military Justice, 43 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 285, 298 (1952).
44. VanLandingham, supra note 42, at 31-32. Professor VanLandingham brings up a critical
point overlooked by other scholars. That is, if the prohibitory practices in the military are not
enforced through the UCMJ, the prohibition cannot be said to serve as a complete deterrent. See id.
at 64. In contrast to her point is the following statement from Professor Peter Margulies:
As U.S. military justice has developed, it has ensured procedural fairness to the accused
and insulated judges and fact-finders from command influence. In establishing
procedures governing courts-martial in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress
assured that “men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional
safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military service.”
Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 336
(2015).
45. See VanLandingham, supra note 42, at 20.
46. See N.G. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 375, 387 (2010) (citing Werking v. United States, 4
Cl. Ct. 101, 105 (1983)). In Skinner v. United States, the Court of Claims determined that it
possessed jurisdiction to review officer evaluation reports that were the subject of improper
command influence. Skinner v. United States, 594 F.2d 824 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also N.G., 94 Fed.
Cl. at 387.
47. See United States v. Hawthorne, 7 C.M.A. 293, 299 (1956); United States v. Faulkner, 7
C.M.A. 304, 305 (1956) (Latimer, J., concurring); United States v. Danzine, 12 C.M.A. 350, 354
(1961) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Judge Homer Ferguson had, prior to his
appointment on the Court of Military Appeals, served as a United States Senator and voted in favor
of the UCMJ. See John T. Willis, Judge Ferguson: Guardian of Individual Rights, ADVOCATE,
Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 1, 1. On Ferguson’s vote for the UCMJ see HR 4080. Unite, Consolidate, Revise
and Clarify the Articles of War, the Articles for the Gov’t of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of
the Coast Guard, and Enact and Establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice. McCarran Motion to
Refer to the Judiciary Committee., GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/811950/s243 (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (voting “yea”).
48. United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 417 & n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2013). The military judge
position was created as a result of the Military Justice Act of 1968. Military Justice Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968). This Act created a system intended to ensure that, where
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trial judge for issuing a ruling verdict or sentence unfavorable to the
government.49 Article 37 is primarily focused on a military
chain-of-command, but it does not, in its plain language, specifically
exclude a President, the Secretary of Defense, or service secretaries.
Instead, Article 37 is silent on the role of those officers, though each has
the authority to convene general courts-martial.50
A. Unlawful Command Influence Prior to 1950: Homcy v. Resor and
Wilson v. Girard
In assessing the expanse of the Commander-in-Chief’s authority
over both individual servicemembers accused of crimes and the armed
forces as a whole on the one side, and unlawful command influence by
the executive branch on the other, it is helpful to consider two judicial
decisions external to the military courts of appeals: Homcy v. Resor51
and Wilson v. Girard.52 In Homcy, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia granted relief to a court-martialed officer on the basis of
improper command influence.53 Importantly, Mr. Albert Homcy’s
court-martial occurred before the UCMJ’s enactment. Although prior to
1950 there was no statutory prohibition against unlawful command
influence, and at that time, no federal appellate court had specifically
granted relief on a claim that the fairness of a court-martial was
undermined by unlawful command influence, the Court of Appeals
applied the prohibition and granted Homcy relief.54 Homcy is easily
interpretable for a conclusion that the prohibition against unlawful
command influence not only predates the UCMJ’s statutory recognition
of its dangers, but also that the prohibition is more expansive than the
plain language of Article 37.55 That is, while Article 37 does not list
civilian officers in the military establishment, the absence of the service
possible, the presiding officer of a court-martial would be a professional military judge, not directly
subordinate to the convening authority. See id. § 826; see also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
264 (1969).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 412 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing 10 U.S.C.
§ 837(a)).
50. See 10 U.S.C. § 822(a).
51. 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
53. Homcy, 455 F.2d at 1352.
54. Id. at 1349, 1352-53. Whether the court-martial conviction was overturned, or the Army
was simply required to issue an honorable discharge is not relevant to the instant issue. However,
for more information, see Bart Barnes, World War II Army Officer Albert C. Homcy Dies at 71,
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/04/03/world-warii-army-officer-albert-c-homcy-dies-at-71/c99a656d-e37c-4e79-973f-8573619ab8c7; Fred L. Borch,
Misbehavior Before the Enemy and Unlawful Command Influence in World War II: The Strange
Case of Albert C. Homcy, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2014, at 1-7.
55. Compare Homcy, 455 F.2d at 1345, with 10 U.S.C. § 837.
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secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, Vice President, and President
within the text of the statute does not preclude military and federal
courts from determining a court-martial verdict adversely to the United
States when unlawful command influence has been caused by one of
these civilians.
It is equally important to note that not all questionable or unpopular
presidential actions over servicemembers constitute unlawful command
influence. Indeed, there is a difference between presidential interference
with courts-martial and presidential authority over courts-martial. For
instance, in between Homcy’s World War II court-martial and the 1971
appellate decision bearing his name, the Court issued Wilson. This
appeal originated from a challenge to the Eisenhower administration’s
transferal of a soldier into Japanese jurisdiction even though a status of
forces agreement between the United States and Japan gave the United
States military primary jurisdiction over American servicemembers
when the alleged crime occurred in the course of duty.56 Private Girard
was accused of killing a Japanese national who trespassed onto a United
States military weapons range.57 Despite opposition from senior Army
officers and judge advocates, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles speciously insisted that Girard was
not in the performance of his official duties at the time of the killing,
even though Girard’s immediate commanding officer signed an affidavit
claiming that he was on duty.58 In essence, Dulles and Wilson tried to
claim that Girard’s conduct was outside of the military’s jurisdiction as a
result of the bilateral agreement with Japan.59 They also publicly
acknowledged that, while they believed the Japanese would conduct the
court “with utmost fairness,” they gave no finite assurances that Girard
would receive a fair trial in a Japanese court.60
On appeal, contrary to Dulles’s and Wilson’s assertion, the Court
observed that Girard was in the performance of his military duties at the
time he killed a Japanese citizen, but concluded that the 1951 security
56. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 525-28. On the agreement between the United States and Japan, see
Security Treaty, Japan-U.S., Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329; Administrative Agreement, Japan-U.S.,
Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 3341.
57. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 525-26.
58. See id. at 526, 529, 536-38; Testimony of Department of Defense and Department of
State: Hearing on the Case of United States Army Specialist Third Class William S. Girard,
Involving the Death of a Japanese Woman on January 30, 1957 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 85th Cong. 3 (1957) (joint statement of John Foster Dulles, United States
Secretary of State, and Charles E. Wilson, United States Secretary of Defense) [hereinafter Girard
Testimony].
59. See Girard Testimony, supra note 58, at 3.
60. See id. at 4. Secretary of Defense Wilson and Secretary of State Dulles merely stated that
“[t]here is every reason to believe that trial of United States Army [Specialist 3d Class] William S.
Girard in the Japanese courts will be conducted with the utmost fairness.” Id.
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agreement recognizing the military’s primary jurisdiction did not afford
him legal protection against being transferred to Japanese jurisdiction.61
The Court was fully aware that the Eisenhower administration
considered relations with the government of Japan—which lobbied for
prosecuting Girard in their domestic courts—to be more important than
maintaining jurisdiction over Girard.62 Members of Congress, along with
a strong public opinion, opposed Eisenhower’s decision to transfer
Girard to Japan.63 Nonetheless, the Court determined that a President
could use international relations as a consideration in determining the
future trial location of a servicemember—even when such location is
within a foreign government.64 Thus, a President may remove a
servicemember to a foreign jurisdiction—a considerable authority over
servicemembers—and doing so is not an unlawful use of his or her
authority.65
While Homcy was denied the right to a fair trial in his
court-martial, and Girard was denied a court-martial altogether, it is
contextually critical to understand that prior to 1950, appeals from
general courts-martial were directed to the Judge Advocate General of
the Army or the Navy, and then onto the Secretary of War or Secretary
of the Navy.66 The Articles of War did not establish an appellate court to
61. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 530. The Court held:
The issue for our decision is therefore narrowed to the question whether, upon the record
before us, the Constitution or legislation subsequent to the Security Treaty prohibited the
carrying out of this provision authorized by the Treaty for waiver of the qualified
jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no constitutional or statutory barrier to the
provision as applied here. In the absence of such encroachments, the wisdom of the
arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the Executive and Legislative
Branches.
Id.
62. See Affidavit with Respect to Facts at 6-8, Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (No. 1103).
63. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. CRAFT, AMERICAN JUSTICE IN TAIWAN: THE 1957 RIOTS AND COLD
WAR FOREIGN POLICY 154-55 (2016); E.W. Kenworthy, Eisenhower Sees Fair Girard Trial:
Voices Confidence in Japan’s Courts - but Criticism on Waiving Rights Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 1957, at 1, 8; D.A.R. Criticizes Pacts: Opposes Turning Girard over to Japanese for Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1957, at 4; The Associated Press, Girard’s Home Town Sends a Petition to White
House, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1957, at 1, 15.
64. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008); United States v. Odom, 53 M.J. 526,
537 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).
65. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 530.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 170 (1886); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 20
(1879). On the functional limitations of habeas in military law, see JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, TO
RAISE AND DISCIPLINE AN ARMY: MAJOR GENERAL ENOCH CROWDER, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL’S OFFICE, AND THE REALIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR I
93 (2017); JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, LAW IN WAR, WAR AS LAW: BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH
HOLT AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR AND EARLY
RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1865, at 59 (2011); Jacob E. Meusch, A “Judicial” System in the Executive
Branch: Ortiz v. United States and the Due Process Implications for Congress and Convening
Authorities, 35 J.L. & POL. 19, 48 (2019).
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review courts-martial, but rather vested responsibility for appellate
review in a single person or a board responsible to the Judge Advocate
General.67 Usually, the review of general courts-martial was conducted
by the Judge Advocate General of the Army or Navy to advise whether a
court-martial was lawfully convened and whether the proceedings
comported with military law.68 In lieu of using the term “appellate,” the
Judge Advocate’s examination of the trial record was often labelled as
the “reviewing authority.”69 The President was the final appellate
authority (or “reviewing authority”) unless a federal court granted
review under the strict habeas test.70 This test, as articulated by the Court
in Dynes v. Hoover71 in 1857, merely and narrowly evaluated whether
the court-martial possessed jurisdiction over the servicemember, and not
whether the servicemember received a fair trial.72 As a result, judicial
decisions prior to 1950, that determined a cause in favor of an aggrieved
court-martialed servicemember, were both noteworthy and rare. On the
other hand, beginning with Burns v. Wilson73 in 1953, the strict habeas
test was gradually replaced with a standard wherein an Article III court
considers whether the military justice system “fully and fairly”
considered an appeal.74
67. WINTHROP, supra note 34, at 683, 685, 687, 708-09.
68. See William F. Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 MO. L. REV. 15,
40-41 (1949).
69. See, e.g., William M. Connor, Reviewing Authority Action in Court-Martial Proceedings,
12 VA. L. REV. 43, 44 (1925).
70. Id. at 43-44; see also JONATHAN LURIE, THE SUPREME COURT AND MILITARY JUSTICE
10-15 (Carole Maurer et al. eds., 2013). For a further exposition on the limits of judicial review in
the early Republic, see Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 209 (1830). Courts-martial are
inferior tribunals and therefore not judicial; as a result, the judicial branch may only collaterally
review these trials. Id.
71. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
72. Id. at 80-81. In Dynes, the Court held that the power to convene courts-martial “is given
without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution.” Id. at 79. For a further
description of the strict habeas test, see Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. at 23. For the legal history of
Dynes v. Hoover and its connection to the ability of the federal government to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Act, see generally Joshua Kastenberg, A Sesquicentennial Historic Analysis of Dynes v.
Hoover and the Supreme Court’s Bow to Military Necessity: From its Relationship to Dred Scott v.
Sandford to its Contemporary Influence, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 595 (2009). Another worthy
articulation of the test is found in Carter v. Roberts. 177 U.S. 496 (1900). The Carter Court held
that:
Courts martial are lawful tribunals, with authority to finally determine any case over
which they have jurisdiction, and their proceedings, when confirmed as provided, are not
open to review by the civil tribunals, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, and whether, though
having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced.
Id. at 498; see also Reilly v. Pescor, 156 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1946).
73. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
74. Id. at 142; see also Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1973). For a
background on and the influence of Burns, see KASTENBERG & MERRIAM, supra note 17, at
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B. Executive Branch Supremacy and the Precedent of Nascent
Democracies
It cannot be doubted that a President has the authority to issue
orders to the entire military, and those orders cannot be countermanded
by a lower-ranking entity within the military establishment.75 Indeed,
military law requires servicemembers to presume that such orders are
lawful.76 In a general sense, officers, service secretaries, the Secretary of
Defense, and the President are vested with the authority to command
their forces to conform to orders.77 Thus, a servicemember subject to the
orders of a command from a person within their chain-of-command may
be required to exercise at certain hours of the day or to wear a foreign
uniform.78 A servicemember may also be required to report for duty to
participate in an unpopular conflict as well as prepare and train others to
participate in the conflict.79 However, Commander-in-Chief authority is
far more expansive than the general authority to command, and not only
so simply because a President can order forces into foreign lands,
remove officers from duty, and depart from the military personnel laws
in wartime.80 A President is protected against disparagement by
servicemembers, as well as by the uniformed defense lawyers
representing servicemembers.81
A brief and concededly incomplete survey of executive branch
authority evidences the power of the President over the military.82 It is
broad enough to send National Guard forces to foreign nations for the
216-232.
75. WINTHROP, supra note 34, at 38. Winthrop noted:
As constitutional Commander-in-[C]hief of the Army, and independently of course of
any authorization or action of Congress, the President is empowered to issue orders to
his command; and the orders duly issued by him in this capacity, while ordinarily of but
temporary importance as compared with his general army regulations, are obligatory and
binding upon whom they concern, and so properly classed as a portion of the general law
military.
Id.
76. 10 U.S.C. § 892(1); United States v. Dykes, 6 M.J. 744, 747-48 (N.C.M.R. 1978).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 17 C.M.A. 246, 247 (1967); United States v.
Obligenhart, 3 C.M.A. 627, 627-28 (1954).
78. See, e.g., United States ex rel. New v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 491, 492-493, 499
(D.D.C. 1996).
79. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736-37, 758-59 (1974).
80. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 123; Commander in Chief Power: Doctrine and Practice, CONST.
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII_S2_C1_1_2 (last visited Nov. 7,
2020).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 167-70 (1967); United States v. Wilcox,
66 M.J. 442, 457 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Baker, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 8, 2018) (using his
constitutional power over the military to amend military rules); Exec. Order No. 13919, 85 Fed.
Reg. 26591 (May 4, 2020) (exercising his constitutional power over the military to order members
of the armed forces into active duty).
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purpose of training, pending Congress’ approval.83 A servicemember
may be court-martialed in a military operation in foreign lands even
when the operation is not sanctioned by Congress.84 When, in 1905, a
federal court first addressed a challenge against court-martial jurisdiction
based on the soldier being sent to China during the so-called “Boxer
Uprising”—an operation Congress never formally approved—the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined, on international law
principles, that the Army maintained jurisdiction.85 Indeed, to this day,
the federal judiciary will not take jurisdiction over questions involving
the use of the military overseas.86 Nor will the federal courts grant
congressional standing to challenge a President’s refusal to comply with
international agreements, such as United Nations sanctions, against an
unpopular or “illegal regime.”87 The military can bring a retired
servicemember back on active duty for the purpose of court-martialing
the retiree, regardless of whether the crime is service-connected or
occurred after the end of formal military service.88 Indeed, a retired
servicemember may be prosecuted for so-called “public morals
offenses” which occurred after retirement and have no military
connections whatsoever.89 The President may also prevent former
servicemembers from immediately seeking specified types of
employment to a degree beyond that of the federal government over its
former civil service employees.90 And finally, the UCMJ enables
military jurisdiction over United States civilians, including citizens,
under some circumstances.91
Whether these judicial decisions and statutes are justified or not,
they each enable the possibility of ordering military forces into a foreign
conflict where they remain subject to presidential orders as well as to the
UCMJ’s full jurisdiction. This is because the President may also send
military forces into an undeclared war without judicial determination of
83. See, e.g., Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 336, 349-50 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416, 417-20 (1922). In Collins, the appellant
raised, as a secondary issue, the fact that he was ordered to Vladivostok on a mission not directly
part of the war against Germany. See KASTENBERG, supra note 70, at 242. Although the Court did
not directly address this challenge, Justice Clarke, in writing for the majority, called it “trivial.” See
id.; Collins, 258 U.S. at 421.
85. Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445, 447-49 (C.C.D. Kan. 1905).
86. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
87. See, e.g., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4)–(5); see also United States v. Miller, 78 M.J. 835, 844 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 2019).
89. See Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437, 439, 442 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Hooper v. United
States, 326 F.2d 982, 983-84, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
90. See Taussig v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757, 758, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1963); see also 18
U.S.C. § 207.
91. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)–(12); see also United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269-70, 269
n.24 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

2020]

FEARS OF TYRANNY

25

its legality.92 And, with congressional authorization, the President may
proscribe rules compelling citizens into military service.93 Apart from
constitutional and statutory Commander-in-Chief authorities recognized
by the Court, the President also has apparent powers, resulting from the
non-justiciable political question doctrine, which include removing the
United States from a treaty obligation.94 This, too, can have a potential
effect on where the military is sent.
While the purpose of this Article is not to diminish presidential
authority in any of the matters presented above, it is clear that none of
these powers have been balanced against pre-constitutional limits on
executive authority over the military, yet such a balance is possible.
William Winthrop informed practitioners that military law is partly
formed by an unwritten lex non scripta and noted that the Dutch military
codes and military experience are included in this lex non scripta.95 The
Swedish warrior king and military innovator, Gustavus Adolphus,
adopted a philosophy of military law and discipline from the Dutch, and,
in turn, the English borrowed from the Swedish Army.96 And in such
experience, with more than nominal relevance, the case of Colonel
Moise Pain et Vin highlights the incompatibility of executive
interference in the military justice process for a people desirous of
democracy.
During the Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678), a Dutch court-martial
sentenced Colonel Pain et Vin to be removed from the military for
surrendering his command without resistance.97 At that time, the Dutch
Republic’s armies were governed by a military code in which the Hoge
Krijgsraad (High Military Court) had jurisdiction over soldiers accused
of both military and common-law crimes.98 A public outcry led by
92. See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 938 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59, 61 (1981).
94. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
95. See WINTHROP, supra note 34, at 4-6, 42-46; KASTENBERG, supra note 34, at 236-37. It
should also not be missed that the military reforms of the early Dutch Republic influenced the
Swedish military of Gustavus Adolphus and the French military of both Louis XIV and Napoleon
Bonaparte. See generally, e.g., John A. Lynn, Forging the Western Army in Seventeenth-Century
France, in THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY REVOLUTION 1300-2050, at 35 (Macgregor Knox &
Williamson Murray eds., 2001).
96. See, e.g., David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV.
129, 132-34, 136 (1980); KASTENBERG, supra note 34, at 236-37.
97. See DONALD HAKS, VADERLAND EN VREDE, 1672-1713: PUBLICITEIT OVER DE
NEDERLANDSE REPUBLIEK IN OORLOG [FATHERLAND AND PEACE, 1672-1713: PUBLICITY ABOUT
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AT WAR] 50 (2013); see also OLAF VAN NIMWEGEN, THE DUTCH ARMY AND
THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONS, 1588-1688, at 343 (Andrew May trans., English ed., The Boydell
Press 2010) (2006).
98. HAKS, supra note 97, at 23; WARFARE AND THE AGE OF PRINTING: CATALOGUE OF
EARLY PRINTED BOOKS FROM BEFORE 1801 IN DUTCH MILITARY COLLECTIONS 105 (Louis Ph.
Sloos ed., 2008).
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clergy and prominent citizens at The Hague demanded Stadtholder
William III mete out “the most severe punishment against the colonel.”99
William III interposed with the Hoge Krijgsraad and demanded it
sentence Pain et Vin to death.100 Based on the Stadtholder’s order, the
Hoge Krijgsraad resentenced Pain et Vin to death and he was
beheaded.101
Anti-monarchist
Republicans
in
the
Second
“Stadtholderless era” used William III’s actions as proof that a
stadtholder could not be entrusted with the command of prosecuting
crimes through military courts.102 By the late eighteenth century, the
elected Dutch government removed common crimes from the military
courts and required that sentences of death adjudged in military trials
and stadtholder pardons be approved by the Council of State, the highest
civil court of the Dutch Republic. 103 While it is true that the example of
Pain et Vin is absent from United States case law, it should be
recognized that even in an emerging democracy, the distrust of
sovereign interference in courts-martial has not been deemed trivial to
the rights of the accused nor those of the nation.
As has been noted, at the United States’ founding, the
Constitution’s framers believed that a standing army was a danger to the
liberties of citizens.104 In the words of Professor Richard Kohn, “No
principle of government was more widely understood or more
completely accepted . . . than the danger of a standing army in
peacetime.”105 The Court has also observed that the founders adopted the
Whig’s fears of standing armies, which became an influence in shaping
the Constitution.106 Nonetheless, a small degree of elaboration highlights
the coupling of the fear of a standing army with an executive who
99. HAKS, supra note 97, at 23.
100. Id.; VAN NIMWEGEN, supra note 97, at 343-44.
101. HAKS, supra note 97, at 23; VAN NIMWEGEN, supra note 97, at 343.
102. HAKS, supra note 97, at 23; VAN NIMWEGEN, supra note 97, at 517.
103. See H.H.A. de Graaff, Some Problems of Military Law Which Have Arisen as a
Consequence of the Use of Armies of International Composition by the Republic of the United
Netherlands, 7 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 229, 234-35 (1968).
104. Their fear emanated from the English Whig concerns regarding standing armies. See
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 350 (1868); Earl F. Martin,
America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135,
144-147 (2006).
105. RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 2 (1975).
106. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760-61, 765-66 (1996). The Court noted that:
Mindful of the historical dangers of autocratic military justice and of the limits
Parliament set on the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-martial over capital crimes in the
first Mutiny Act, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5 (1689), and having experienced the military
excesses of the Crown in colonial America, the Framers harbored a deep distrust of
executive military power and military tribunals.
Id. at 760.
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commands in ignorance of the laws governing the military. In 1642,
John March articulated Parliament’s claim that the Crown could not be
considered a supreme commander over the militia.107 In 1689, with the
passage of the Mutiny Act, William and Mary were precluded from
determining the extent of military jurisdiction in Britain, and the
maintenance of the standing army in Britain was subject to annual
renewal by Parliament.108 In the Mutiny Act, Parliament declared a
general military law principle that “noe man may be forejudged of Life
or Limbe, or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall Law, or
in any other manner than by the Judgement of his Peeres, and according
to the knowne and Established Laws of this Realme.”109 In 1697, John
Trenchard, a well-known political writer, or “pamphleteer,” of the late
seventeenth century, warned that where there is a standing army, “[T]he
King is perpetual General, may model the Army as he pleases, and it
will be called High-Treason to oppose him.”110 Trenchard also argued
that a sovereign’s use of standing armies could lead to the destruction of
a constitution.111
In the rebelling colonies that became the United States, King
George III’s use of a standing army (with the addition of Hessian
mercenaries) was “bitterly resented, and appears among the grievances
listed in the Declaration of Independence.”112 Shortly after arriving as
the Ambassador to France, Thomas Jefferson made it known to the new
nation that standing armies were antithetical to the new republic.113
Likewise, Delegate Edmund Randolph noted at the Virginia ratifying
107. See Lois G. Schwoerer, “The Fittest Subject for a King’s Quarrel”: An Essay on the
Militia Controversy 1641-1642, 11 J. BRIT. STUD. 45, 67-68, 71-72 (1971); see also JANELLE
GREENBERG, THE RADICAL FACE OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: ST EDWARD’S “LAWS” IN
EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 201-02 (2001).
108. Bill of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.); The First Mutiny Act 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 5
(Eng.); see also F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: A COURSE OF
LECTURES DELIVERED 328-29 (1931).
109. The First Mutiny Act 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 5 (Eng.). The act, however, decreed swift and
capital punishment for mutinies and desertions. Id.
110. John Trenchard, An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a Free
Government, and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy, in JOHN
TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS 1, 11 (1697). The radical Whigs,
among them John Trenchard, “are remembered today as rigid defenders of personal liberties in the
face of Britain’s increasingly powerful fiscal-military state.” Adam Lebovitz, An Economy of
Violence: Financial Crisis and Whig Constitutional Thought, 1720-1721, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMANS.
165, 168-169 (2017).
111. Trenchard, supra note 110, at 11-13.
112. See, e.g., David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 518
(2008).
113. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Ambassador to Fr., to James Madison, Va. Delegate to the
Continental Cong. (Dec. 20, 1787) (reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 914, 916, 918
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)); see also Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1958).
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convention that “there was not a member in the federal Convention, who
did not feel indignation” at the idea of a standing army.114 One only need
recall that James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, argued:
[T]he liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military
triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed,
have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military
establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same
time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has
its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be
fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and
precaution.115

Finally, coupled with the fear of standing armies, and only for the
purposes of the central point of this Article, is the ancient principle that
neither a monarch nor a President is above the law.116 Long ago, in
Entick v. Carrington,117 Lord Camden established the rule important to
constitutional law that a sovereign may only act in accordance with the
established law.118 While Entick is usually cited in the realm of Fourth
Amendment analysis, it has also been incorporated into military law.119
Congress and the federal judiciary alike have acknowledged that the fear
of standing armies was an original concern of the framers and shaped
military law.120
C. Misinterpreted History and Misplaced Analysis: Swaim v. United
States
Prior to Bergdahl’s court-martial, perhaps the most deleterious
presidential action over military justice was President Chester Alan
Arthur’s attempt to have a court-martial increase the sentence of a
114. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401 (2d ed. 1901).
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 262 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
116. See, e.g., Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2432 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In
our system of government, as this Court has often stated, no one is above the law. That principle
applies, of course, to a President.”).
117. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807.
118. Id. at 817-18; see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,692d). This decision is an early judicial ruling in which a United States court determined
that a President was subject to the law of the courts. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall, while acting as
a circuit judge, determined that President Jefferson was not immunized from giving testimony on
important matters under adjudication. Id.; see also Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (1974).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Hillan, 26 C.M.R. 771, 793 (N.B.R. 1958).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). In Miller, the Court
recognized “[t]he sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was
that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia—civilians primarily,
soldiers on occasion.” Id.; see also United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 204 (1963).
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convicted general officer.121 Of course, the Army in Arthur’s time was
quite small, numbering less than 27,000 soldiers and officers.122 Arthur,
who served as President from 1881 to 1885, was unhappy with a
court-martial’s sentence for Brigadier General David Swaim, the Army’s
Judge Advocate General.123 In the closing days of Rutherford Hayes’s
presidency, Swaim was elevated from the rank of major to brigadier
general, largely owing to his close friendship with President-elect James
A. Garfield, and this may have led to anger within the Army’s officer
corps.124 Arthur apparently distrusted Swaim for at least one other
reason. After Sergeant John A. Mason, while on guard duty, tried to
murder Charles Guiteau (the assassin of President Garfield), the Army
court-martialed Mason.125 Swaim, in his duty as Judge Advocate
General, advised disapproving the conviction as the charge against
Mason was civil in nature and therefore fell outside of the Army’s
jurisdiction.126 Arthur disagreed, and when Mason appealed to the Court,
Arthur ordered Swaim to be shut out of the process.127 Mason’s courtmartial and appeal garnered considerable newspaper reporting, including
negative aspersions on the President’s decisions.128
On April 22, 1884, Arthur acted as a convening authority and
ordered a court of inquiry (a predecessor to the modern Article 32
investigation) to investigate Swaim.129 Based on the court of inquiry’s
findings, on June 30, 1884, Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln
appointed a general court-martial to prosecute Swaim, and on July 22,
121. William R. Robie, The Court-Martial of a Judge Advocate General: Brigadier General
David G. Swaim (1884), 56 MIL. L. REV. 211, 225-27 (1972).
122. See 1 SEC’Y OF WAR ANN. REP. 17 (1881); see also ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER
REGULARS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE INDIAN 1866-1891, at 15-16 (1973).
123. JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, SHAPING U.S. MILITARY LAW: GOVERNING A CONSTITUTIONAL
MILITARY 9 (2014).
124. Robie, supra note 121, at 211-12; KASTENBERG, supra note 34, at 215.
125. See, e.g., Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 696-97 (1881).
126. Letter from David G. Swaim, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to Robert T. Lincoln, U.S.
Sec’y of War (Apr. 12, 1882) (on file with the National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C). Swaim wrote to Lincoln that the charge against Mason “was exclusively for the
consideration of the criminal court of the District [of Columbia].” Id.
127. Letter from Robert Lincoln, U.S. Sec’y of War, to David D. Swaim, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S.
Army (Apr. 15, 1882). After informing Swaim that he was acting at the “direction of the President,”
Lincoln noted that he had assigned Major Asa Bird Gardiner, who had acted as judge advocate at
Mason’s court-martial, to work with the Attorney General in representing the government. Id.
Lincoln concluded his letter with a caustic note: “I am advised by the Attorney General that he will
require no further aid [from you].” Id. Perhaps emboldening Arthur’s later actions against Swaim,
the Court in Ex parte Mason applied the traditional habeas test and upheld the conviction on the
basis that “the offence charged . . . was clearly one to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline,” which enabled the Army’s jurisdiction. Mason, 105 U.S. at 698-700.
128. See, e.g., The Invalid Sentence of Sergt. Mason, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1882, at 2.
129. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 178 (1893). On courts of inquiry, see generally
WINTHROP, supra note 34, at 795-822.
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1884, Lincoln ordered Swaim arrested and confined to Washington,
D.C.’s geographical limits.130 Composed of “a veritable ‘who’s-who’” of
Civil War veterans including Generals John McAlister Schofield, Alfred
Terry, and Nelson A. Miles, the court-martial found Swaim guilty of
some, but not all of the charges and sentenced him to be suspended from
rank and duty for three years.131 The sentence displeased the President
who obtained support from Attorney General Benjamin Brewster to
reopen the court-martial and directly express his displeasure to the
officers sitting in judgment of Swaim.132 The next day, Arthur ordered
the court-martial reconvened and provided Brewster’s written advice to
the officers while at the same time ordering them to reconsider their
finding of not guilty to one of the charges and the appropriateness of the
overall sentence.133 Brewster’s advice was clearly an admonishment of
the court-martial’s initial sentence as evidenced by the following
statement:
The action of the court as a whole seems to involve a serious lowering
of that high standard of honor which from the earliest days has been
the pride and the glory of our military service, and which was
expressed
on
a
memorable
occasion
by
the
great
Commander-in-[C]hief of our Revolutionary armies, when reluctantly
compelled to reprimand a brother officer, in these words: “Our
profession is the chastest of all; even the shadow of a fault tarnishes
the luster of our finest achievements.”134

130. Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 181.
131. Id. at 190-91, 94; KASTENBERG, supra note 34, at 227 (discussing the officers assigned to
the court-martial of Swaim). Swaim was confronted with a second court-martial, but that trial
quickly acquitted him. See Robie, supra note 124, at 227, 234.
132. See Letter from Benjamin Harris Brewster, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Chester A. Arthur, U.S.
President (Feb. 10, 1885), in 18 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 113-20 (A.J. Bentley ed., 1890); Letter from Chester A. Arthur, U.S. President, to the
General Court-Martial (Feb. 11, 1885) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C.).
133. Letter from Chester A. Arthur, to the General Court-Martial, supra note 132. Arthur
informed the court-martial:
The record in the foregoing case of Brigadier General David G. Swaim Judge Advocate
General, U.S.A., is hereby returned to the General Court Martial before which the
proceedings were had for reconsideration as to the findings upon the first charge only,
and as to the sentence, neither of which are believed to be commensurate with the
offenses as found by the Court in the first and third specifications under the first charge.
The attention of the Court is invited to the accompanying communication of the Attorney
General under date of the 10th instant, whose views upon the matter submitted for
reconsideration have any concurrence.
Id.
134. See Letter from Benjamin Harris Brewster, to Chester A. Arthur, supra note 132.
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This time, the court-martial sentenced Swaim to a one-year
suspension and a reduction of rank to major on his return to the army. 135
The court-martial, however, did not have the lawful authority to sentence
Swaim to a reduction in rank, and this caused Arthur to order the
court-martial to reconsider its sentence for a second time. 136 The
President conveyed to the court-martial his belief that while it had
intended to sentence Swaim more harshly than the original sentence, it
did so improperly.137 After reconsidering its second sentence, the
court-martial sentenced Swaim to be suspended from duty for twelve
years and to forfeit half of his monthly pay during this period.138 Arthur
approved of this sentence, though he chastised the court-martial for
being too lenient.139 Although the court-martial increased Swaim’s
sentence, the final sentence did not include a dismissal, and Swaim
remained on the War Department’s payroll as an officer.140 Moreover,
the court-martial garnered media attention from outlets such as the New
York Times.141 Indeed, The New York Times published the President’s
three statements to the court-martial after the final sentence was
announced.142
After Grover Cleveland succeeded Chester Arthur as President,
Swaim alleged to Secretary of War William Endicott (Secretary of War
135. Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 200.
136. See Letter from Chester A. Arthur, U.S. President, to the General Court-Martial (Feb. 14,
1885) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.).
137. Id. On February 14, Arthur instructed the court-martial:
It is apparent from the terms of the amended sentence that it was the intention of the
Court to award a punishment of greater severity and more nearly commensurate with the
offenses of which the accused has been found guilty than was the penalty adjudged in the
original proceedings; and if the terms of the amended sentence were such as could be
legally carried out, the purpose of the Court in that regard would have been
accomplished.
Id.
138. Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 201.
139. Letter from Chester A. Arthur, U.S. President, to the General Court-Martial (Feb. 24,
1885) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.). President
Arthur admonished the court-martial, stating:
[I]t is difficult to understand how the Court could be willing to have the officer tried,
retained as a pensioner upon the Army Register, while it expressed its sense of his
unfitness to perform the duties of his important office by the imposition of two different
sentences, under either of which he would be deprived permanently of his functions.
Id.
140. See Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 201; Swaim’s Remarkable Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1885,
at 1.
141. See, e.g., The Swaim Court-Martial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1884, at 3; see also Swaim
Court Martial Concluded—Dynamite Resolutions, INDIANAPOLIS SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1885, at 1; The
Swaim Court Martial Decision Causes Some of the Senators to Express Themselves, DUBUQUE
DAILY HERALD, Feb. 26, 1885, at 1.
142. General Swaim’s Punishment: Suspended from Rank and Duty for Twelve Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1885, at 3.
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Robert Lincoln’s successor) that when Arthur caused Brewster’s advice
to be presented to the court-martial, he did so without informing counsel
for Swaim nor Swaim himself.143 In turn, President Cleveland publicly
articulated his disgust with the Army’s court-martial process in his first
annual message to Congress:
If some of the proceedings of courts-martial which I have had occasion
to examine present the ideas of justice which generally prevail in these
tribunals, I am satisfied that they should be much reformed if the honor
and the honesty of the Army and Navy are by their instrumentality to
be vindicated and protected.144

Cleveland was not alone in his disgust. Senator John Ingalls, a Kansas
Republican, called Swaim’s court-martial “a disgrace to civilization”
and chastised his fellow Republican, Chester Arthur, for compelling the
court to render a harsher verdict.145 Republican Senators Henry Dawes,
George Frisbie Hoar, and John Sherman likewise excoriated the conduct
of the court-martial.146
Swaim urged the Cleveland administration that Arthur’s and
Bristow’s actions “invad[ed] the province of the Court to persuade, if not
dictate what should be its finding and sentence.”147 The surviving
court-martial record, now housed at the National Archives and Records
Administration, supports Swaim’s argument that he was absent from
both the reconvening of the court-martial, and therefore unable to
quickly reply to Bristow’s written opinions to the court-martial.148 He is
not listed on record of trial for February 3 or February 12, 1885, when
Arthur “invited” the reconvened court-martial to consider the
“accompanying communication of the Attorney General.”149 It is likely
the case that Cleveland believed Arthur, Lincoln, and Bristow had
denied Swaim a fair trial, but also believed that he could not lawfully

143. Letter from David G. Swaim, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to William C. Endicott, U.S.
Sec’y of War (Dec. 30, 1885) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C.). Swaim claimed to Endicott that Arthur had caused to occur a “carefully
prepared argument by the Attorney General of the United States, which was read to the court by the
Judge Advocate.” Id.
144. Grover Cleveland, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1885), in 8 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 53 (James D. Richardson ed.,
2005) (ebook).
145. Swaim’s Remarkable Sentence, supra note 140.
146. See id.; see also Members of the 51st Congress, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/congres
s/members/?chamber=senate&congress=51&all (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
147. Letter from David G. Swaim to William C. Endicott, supra note 143.
148. Id.
149. See Statement of Chester A. Arthur, supra note 132; Transcript of Record, Swaim v.
United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893) (No. 16859) (on file with National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C.).
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remedy the wrong.150 In the end, Cleveland, in his first term, did not give
any relief to Swaim, apparently deferring until a civil court determined
the issue.151
In 1891, Swaim filed suit against the United States in the Court of
Claims in an attempt to recoup the half pay he forfeited.152 Swaim’s
leading argument was that Arthur did not have the statutory authority to
order the court-martial in the first place, and not that Arthur had
committed unlawful command influence.153 In a decision authored by
Judge Charles Nott, a Civil War Union Army veteran, the Court of
Claims determined that a President could, in fact, convene a
court-martial.154 Oddly, as Judge Nott noted, on February 7, 1885—in
the midst of Swaim’s court-martial—the United States Senate affirmed
in a resolution that a President could order a general court-martial
convened against an officer.155 However, Judge Nott never determined
that a President had absolute control over courts-martial and, indeed,
observed that even as Commander-in-Chief, the President would have to
conform his or her actions over courts-martial to Congress’ authority to
“make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.”156 Perhaps because Swaim did not argue that Arthur had
supreme authority over the military, Judge Nott, writing for the Court of
Claims, did not express a concern that the President had used his
Commander-in-Chief authority to unlawfully influence the court-martial.
While Judge Nott found that Arthur ordered the court-martial to
reconsider its sentence, he did not find that the President required it to
impose a harsher one.157 Judge Nott opined that had the President
150. See, e.g., The Case of Gen. Swaim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1889, at 4. The Times reported,
“This, then, is the situation which Mr. Cleveland found on his accession to the Presidency, less than
a fortnight afterward . . . . Several ways of relieving the army from the embarrassment have been
suggested, but objections have been found to all.” Id.
151. See Robie, supra note 124, at 235-37.
152. Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 236.
153. Id. at 213.
154. Id. at 221. Judge Nott observed:
It may be historically true that the [C]ommander[-]in[-C]hief during the Revolution
ascribed his power to order courts-martial directly to the Continental Congress; and it
may also be true that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution the annual consent of
Parliament to the existence of a standing army was conditioned upon statutory provisions
relating to such military tribunals, though upon these historical questions the court
expresses no opinion; but nevertheless there remains the significant fact in our military
system that the President is always the [C]ommander[-]in[-C]hief. Congress may
increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether; but so long as we have a
military force Congress cannot take away from the President the supreme command.
Id.
155. Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 557-58 (1897).
156. Swaim, 28 Ct. Cl. at 221-22 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
157. Id. at 235-36. Indeed, Judge Nott stated:
On the one hand, it may be said of this case that the President did not interfere with the
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required a harsher sentence, such an action would be unlawful in a civil
tribunal, but consideration of the issue was not within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims because the court was limited to the strict habeas
test.158 Thus, Judge Nott never addressed the issue of presidential
influence over courts-martial. Rather, he determined that undue
influence in courts-martial was non-reviewable by the civil courts.159
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice George Shiras,
likewise determined it did not possess jurisdiction over Swaim’s appeal
because the court-martial was lawfully constituted, and the President had
the authority to order the court-martial into being, as well as to comply
with his constitutional and statutory authorities.160 Additionally, the
justices made it clear that the British Mutiny Act’s prohibitions against
the crown (or other convening authority) sending findings or sentences
back to a court-martial for a second reconsideration were inapplicable to
courts-martial because Congress had statutorily authorized the President
to do so.161
As an opinion oft-cited by adherents of executive authority and in
judicial decisions, Swaim does not, despite inaccurate claims to the
contrary, uphold presidential power to have almost unfettered control
over courts-martial.162 This fundamental misunderstanding regarding
Swaim was most recently evidenced in Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in
Ortiz v. United States.163 Justice Alito insisted that “until 1920 the
President and commanding officers could disapprove a court-martial
sentence and order that a more severe one be imposed instead, for
whatever reason. We twice upheld the constitutionality of this
practice.”164 Justice Alito clearly missed Judge Nott’s observation
discretion of the court; that he did not require it to impose a more severe sentence; that
he merely invited it to reconsider its determination of the case, and left it free to
reimpose the same sentence or to impose a milder one or a more severe one.
Id.
158. Id. (citing Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879)).
159. Id. at 220.
160. Swaim, 165 U.S. at 558, 566.
161. Id. at 564-65.
162. Frederick Bernays Wiener was among the scholars who argued that the Court in Swaim
recognized presidential influence in courts-martial. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial
and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72 HARV. L. REV. 266, 273 (1958).
163. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2200 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). Not
surprisingly, Justice Alito cites to Wiener in support of his argument. Id. It should be noted,
however, that Wiener championed executive branch supremacy to the point that he insisted, as late
as 1984, that President Roosevelt had the constitutional authority to intern United States citizens of
Japanese descent during World War II. See Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime
Internment and Relocation of Citizens: Hearing on S. 2116 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. Serv., Post
Off., and Gen. Servs. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 98th Cong. 264-68 (1986) (statement
of Frederick Bernays Weiner).
164. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2201. Even allowing for his not reading the Court of Claims decision
and merely relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Swaim, Justice Alito failed to note that the
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(notwithstanding the criticism of prominent senators) that the judiciary
could not determine whether Arthur had ordered the court-martial to
assess a tougher sentence. In addition to Justice Alito’s erroneous claim
that a President could order a harsher sentence “for whatever reason,” he
missed another important fact: the Swaim Court never addressed the
constitutionality of the practice of disapproving a court-martial sentence,
but simply focused on the limited jurisdiction of federal courts and on
the Army’s adherence to its own procedures.165 It did so because the
justices had earlier established, in Keyes v. United States,166 that as long
as a court-martial possessed lawful jurisdiction over an accused
servicemember, the federal judiciary could not collaterally review the
findings or sentence imposed, even with evidence of procedural
irregularities to the accused servicemember’s detriment.167
Stated plainly: in Swaim, the Court did not uphold the
constitutionality of Arthur’s actions in trying to influence the
court-martial. The justices merely held that the President’s actions did
not violate prescribed regulations at the time, and therefore, the federal
judiciary did not possess habeas jurisdiction over Swaim’s appeal.168
Nor did the Court, in neither Swaim nor the second opinion Justice Alito
cited to, Ex Parte Reed,169 hold that an order for a court-martial to
reconvene for the purpose of issuing a stricter punishment comported
Supreme Court relied on the Army regulations at the time and cited to them in the following passage
from the 1897 opinion:
When a court-martial appears to have erred in any respect, the reviewing authority may
reconvene the court for a consideration of its action, with suggestions for its guidance.
The court may thereupon, should it concur in the views submitted, proceed to remedy the
errors pointed out, and may modify or completely change its findings. The object of
reconvening the court in such a case is to afford it an opportunity to reconsider the
record for the purpose of correcting or modifying any conclusions thereupon, and to
make any amendments of the record necessary to perfect it.
Swaim, at 165 U.S. at 564-65. Even liberally interpreting this passage, it cannot be said that a
President could order a court-martial sentence increased “for any reason.” While it is true that there
were occasions in which courts-martial may have violated the prohibition against double jeopardy—
according to Frederick Bernays Wiener, the 1806 Articles of War expressly prohibited double
jeopardy trials, and Winthrop never wrote that acquittals were subject to revision—there were a
small number of lamentable instances in which this occurred, despite its illegality. See Wiener,
supra note 162, at 272-77, 273 n.362. However, in 1919, Congress put a stop to the practice. See id.
at 273-74, 274 n.366.
165. See Swaim, 165 U.S. at 561, 566; see also Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Review of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 160 MIL. L. REV. 96, 132 (1999). Judge (and current professor) Maggs
penned, “The Court in Swaim did not indicate what limits, if any, exist on the President’s power to
act with respect to courts-martial absent statutory authority.” Maggs, supra, at 132.
166. 109 U.S. 336 (1883).
167. Id. at 340. Earlier, in Wise v. Withers, the Court determined that where a court-martial did
not possess jurisdiction, the judiciary could exercise jurisdiction through habeas. 7. U.S. (3 Cranch)
331, 331, 337 (1806).
168. Swaim, 165 U.S. at 561-66.
169. 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879).
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with the Constitution. To the contrary, the Court in Reed held that as
long as a naval court-martial had not been “dissolved,” a commander
could reconvene the court-martial to reconsider a sentence because of a
mistake of law made by the court-martial.170 There is one other
consideration which Justice Alito apparently did not entertain: Arthur,
like his two immediate predecessors and successors through 1917, was
also restrained by the Posse Comitatus Act.171 Enacted in 1878, this
congressional act barred the use of the Army to serve in a domestic law
enforcement capacity unless authorized to do so by Congress.172 Thus,
the Court decided Swaim during a time when presidential authority over
the Army was considerably curbed. The most that can be said of Swaim,
in reality, is that the federal judiciary should, in deciding whether to
grant an appeal from a court-martial review, operate with the
presumption that the President acted in conformance with his or her
statutory duties.173 Such a presumption, as noted in Part IV, is no longer
possible in the case of the current administration.174
III.

THE SOUND HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY LAW: LIMITS
ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER MILITARY JUSTICE

Between 1875 and 1908, the Court issued three opinions which, at a
minimum, evidence a constitutional tolerance for limiting
Commander-in-Chief authority when a President acts contrary to
accepted fair trial standards in courts-martial. Each of the three opinions,
Runkle v. United States,175 McClaughry v. Deming,176 and Grafton v.
United States,177 illustrate that a President cannot command military
justice without adhering to statutory obligations or other fundamental
due process rights to a fair trial.178 A fuller understanding as to why
170. See id. at 22.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. For a brief history of the Act, see generally Andrew Buttaro, The Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878 and the End of Reconstruction, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 135 (2015). While the
Act is still in existence, it has been considerably defanged. See id. at 182-83 (listing various
exceptions that have been carved out of the Posse Comitatus Act).
172. See Buttaro, supra note 171, at 181-82.
173. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897). In Chapman, the Court, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Melvin Fuller, briefly noted that Swaim narrowed Runkle in favor of such
a presumption. See id. at 670-71. It should be noted, however, that Chapman did not arise from a
court-martial appeal. Rather, it arose from a citizen refusing to answer questions before a “special
committee of the Senate,” and then being prosecuted in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (then, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia). See In re Chapman, 156
U.S. 211, 212-13 (1895).
174. See infra Part IV.D.
175. 19 Ct. Cl. 396 (1884).
176. 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
177. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
178. See infra Part III.A–C.
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these cases are important to the current problem of presidential unlawful
command influence is possible through a historic examination of the
traverse of each of the opinions. Moreover, each of these opinions places
Swaim into a proper context. Rather than Swaim standing for the
proposition that a President can act in a manner independent of due
process constraints, these opinions cabin Swaim in a narrower category,
as an opinion issued prior to the end of the strict habeas test and the
enactment of Article 32 and other applicable rules and modern military
law jurisprudence.179
A.

Runkle v. United States: Statutory Obligations on the Executive

In Runkle v. United States,180 in 1887, the Court held that, if a
President failed to comply with the statutory requirement of approving
an officer’s court-martial conviction and sentence, the court-martial’s
determination of guilt and its corresponding sentence was rendered into
a nullity.181 Major Benjamin Runkle, a Union Army Civil War veteran,
was commissioned into the Freedmen’s Bureau after retiring from the
Army.182 Established in 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau was a part of the
Department of War and was charged with various duties endemic to
Reconstruction, such as providing food, medical care, and education to
recently freed persons of color, as well as ensuring that voting rights
were not destroyed by southern whites.183 A senior military commander
accused Runkle of misappropriating federal funds for his personal use.184
Runkle was charged, under the 67th Article of War, for defrauding the
widow of a black soldier, along with twelve other black soldiers or their
dependents.185 After being convicted and sentenced to a dismissal,
Runkle appealed to Secretary of War William Belknap, claiming that the

179. See infra Part III.D.
180. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
181. Id. at 558.
182. See Runkle v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 396, 405 (1884); see also Ross A. Webb, “The
Past Is Never Dead, It’s Not Even Past”: Benjamin P. Runkle and the Freedmen’s Bureau in
Kentucky, 1866-1870, 84 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 343, 350-51 (1986).
183. See Robert C. Lieberman, The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Politics of Institutional
Structure, 18 SOC. SCI. HIST. 405, 412, 414, 416-17, 420, 422-23 (1994).
184. See Webb, supra note 182, at 356-57.
185. See id. at 353; Letter from Joseph Holt, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to William Belknap,
Sec’y of War (Aug. 15, 1872) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C.); see also Runkle, 19 Ct. Cl. at 406. Runkle became controversial with the white
city leaders in Memphis after accusing the mayor of the city of fomenting riots against colored
soldiers under his command, and later, Runkle served as the Freedman’s Bureau superintendent for
Kentucky. See also Marius Carriere, An Irresponsible Press: Memphis Newspapers and the 1866
Riot, in WORDS AT WAR: THE CIVIL WAR AND AMERICAN JOURNALISM 339-40 (David B.
Sachsman et al eds., 2008); Webb, supra note 182, at 350.
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President had appointed the court-martial without a statutory grant of
authority.186
To this end, Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, in conformance
with the duties of his office as a reviewing authority, advised President
Ulysses Grant on Runkle’s objections to the court-martial.187 Perhaps
presaging Swaim, Holt insisted that it was doubtful Congress “could
constitutionally take away from the President a power so essential to the
efficacy of his office as Commander[-]in[-]Chief.”188 To Holt, the
Commander-in-Chief power essential to preserve was the ability for a
President to forgo strict compliance with a statutory requirement in
courts-martial oversight.189 In one sense, Holt’s position was undercut by
the Court in 1958. In Harmon v. Brucker,190 the Court determined that
the military had to fully comply with its own regulations, and these
regulations could not narrow statutes governing the military.191 While
this issue was not central to Runkle’s eventual judicial appeal, Holt
echoed a belief that presidential authority over military justice was both
broad and deep, if not unlimited.192 In contrast to Holt, the Court in
186. See Runkle, 19 Ct. Cl. at 407.
187. See Letter from Joseph Holt to William Belknap, supra note 185.
188. See id. Holt’s full comment is as follows:
The most important is the objection that the President or Secretary of War had no power
to appoint the Court, because either could derive such a power only from Congress,
which has legislated on the subject only by the Act of Congress of May 29, 1830,
chapter 179, entitled, An Act to [A]lter and [A]mend the 65th of the Articles [of War]
and providing that in case where a Department Commander is the Accuser the Court
shall be appointed by the President . . . . Doubtless in England, parliament, in what has
been called its omnipotence, could, with the royal assent, forbid the King to convene
Courts Martial; but it may well be questioned whether Congress could, constitutionally,
take away from the President a power so essential to the efficacy of his office as
Commander-in[-]Chief, although there is no reason of fundamental law why inferior
officers should not be authorized, as they are by the 65th Article [of War], to participate
in the exercise of the same power.
Id.
189. Id. Interestingly, during the Civil War, Attorney General Edward Bates took a position
opposite to Holt’s. In a formal opinion, Bates determined:
Undoubtedly the President, in passing upon the sentence of a court martial, and giving to
it the approval without which it cannot be executed, acts judicially. The whole
proceeding from its inception is judicial. The trial, finding, and sentence, are the solemn
acts of a court organized and conducted under the authority and according to the
prescribed forms of law.
11 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (J. Hubley Ashton
ed., 1869). In Runkle, the Court cited to Bates’s view as dispositive. Runkle v. United States, 122
U.S. 543, 557-58 (1887).
190. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
191. See id. at 582-83. Harmon arose from two related appeals in which the military issued
undesirable discharges to otherwise honorable servicemembers after discovering that both
servicemembers had been affiliated with organizations listed on the Attorney General’s Subversive
Organizations List. See id. at 580; KASTENBERG & MERRIAM, supra note 17, at 206.
192. See Letter from Joseph Holt to William W. Belknap, supra note 185.
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Runkle ultimately determined there is a corollary and enforceable duty
for a President to act judicially over courts-martial.193
Runkle, a decision authored by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, arose
from Runkle’s demand for back-dated retirement pay against the
government’s insistence that he was not entitled to such pay because the
President was without authority to restore him to duty since he had been
removed from the military by a court-martial.194 In 1875, Holt had
retired and Brigadier General William McKee Dunn replaced him.195
Dunn apparently had a different view than Holt on the fairness of
Runkle’s trial and advised Secretary of War Alphonso Taft (William
Belknap’s successor) to have President Rutherford Hayes overturn the
court-martial since Grant had never approved of the findings or
sentence.196 Moreover, Runkle had other supporters such as
then-Congressman James A. Garfield and then-Treasury Secretary
Benjamin Bristow, who likewise lobbied Taft.197 And Runkle’s
restoration was well-reported in the news.198 Indeed, unlike in
Bergdahl’s case, shortly after the court-martial, a number of legislators
had passed resolutions supporting Runkle.199
On August 4, 1877, on Dunn’s advice, Hayes disapproved of the
court-martial and restored Runkle to duty for the purposes of
retirement.200 Runkle then sought backpay from the Court of Claims but
lost before that court after it determined that Hayes could not restore a
court-martialed officer to rank and service.201 Therefore, according to the
Court of Claims, Runkle was not entitled to retirement backpay.202 The
United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed and determined that
the duty placed on Grant was more than ministerial.203 Instead, the
presidential duty to formally approve the proceedings was a judicial act
193. Runkle, 122 U.S. at 557.
194. See id. at 550.
195. On Dunn replacing Holt, see ELIZABETH D. LEONARD, LINCOLN’S FORGOTTEN ALLY:
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL JOSEPH HOLT OF KENTUCKY 300 (2011).
196. See Letter from William McKee Dunn, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to Alphonso Taft,
Sec’y of War (May 3, 1876) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C.); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1887).
197. See Webb, supra note 182, at 357.
198. See, e.g., Dishonoring the Army and Navy: Restoration of Dismissed Officers on
Microscopic Technicalities—Draper’s and Runkle’s Cases—Questionable Legality of the Acts—
Congressional Inquiry Probable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1877, at 1.
199. See Webb, supra note 182, at 357 & n.56.
200. Runkle, 122 U.S. at 548-49.
201. Runkle v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 396, 407, 417-19 (1884). Adding complexity and
context to Runkle’s suit was that the Senate investigated Runkle’s case and determined that
President Hayes had acted improperly in restoring Runkle to duty. See Webb, supra note 182, at
358-59.
202. Runkle, 19 Ct. Cl. at 419.
203. Runkle, 122 U.S. at 557.
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rather than an administrative requirement and, as a result, the
court-martial could not be concluded as final.204 As an example of how
Runkle has been characterized by scholars who advocate for judicial
non-interference, if not unitary executive control over military justice,
Professor Margulies merely notes that Runkle places a “judicial duty” on
the President, but he excludes the fact that the failure to do so was
considered to be of a jurisdictional nature in which, even under the strict
habeas test, the judiciary could review.205 Thus, when Congress places
an affirmative duty on the President to act judicially, the ignorance of
this duty deprives a court-martial of jurisdiction.206
B. McClaughry v. Deming: Statutory Restraints Against the Executive
On February 10, 1902, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in Deming v. McClaughry,207 overturned Captain Peter
Deming’s court-martial conviction and sentence for embezzling federal
monies, forgery, and conduct unbecoming of an officer and
gentleman.208 The Eighth Circuit’s decision was remarkable in several
respects. Deming had pled guilty to the offense and did not object to the
jurisdiction of the court-martial when it occurred two years earlier.209
Unsurprisingly, in light of the guilty plea, the Judge Advocate General,
in his review, did not articulate any unusual aspects of the
court-martial.210 Yet the appellate court elaborated that Runkle had
required a court-martial not only to possess jurisdiction over the parties,
but also required “that all the statutory regulations governing its
proceedings had been complied with, and that its sentence was
204. See id. at 557-58, 560-61.
205. See Margulies, supra note 44, at 335-36.
206. See id.; Runkle, 122 U.S. at 555-56.
207. 113 F. 639 (8th Cir. 1902).
208. Id. at 651-52; Capt. Deming’s Appeal: Supreme Court Hears Argument in the Case of a
Volunteer Officer Convicted of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1902, at 8; Capt. Deming’s
Courtmartial: United States Supreme Court Decides that It Was Illegal, N.Y. T IMES, May 20, 1902,
at 3.
209. Deming, 113 F. at 649; Capt. Deming’s Courtmartial: United States Supreme Court
Decides that It Was Illegal, supra note 208.
210. Letter from G.N. Lieber, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to Elihu Root, U.S. Sec’y of War
(May 9, 1900) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.). The
Judge Advocate General’s review states:
The accused offered no evidence; but at the suggestion of his counsel, the
judge-advocate admitted for the prosecution that restitution had been made to Mr.
Hirschfelder and Mrs. Ogden, though it appears as to the latter that the attempt to
defraud her was not successful. The record shows that no restitution has been made to
the United States. The officer ordering the court, Major General Shafter, has approved
the proceedings, findings, and sentence. The sentence is legal and it is recommended that
it be confirmed.
Id.
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conformable to law.”211 In essence, the Court of Appeals served notice to
the executive branch that Congress could place statutory restraints
against the exercise of military discipline, and the executive branch’s
failure to conform to these statutory restraints deprived the court-martial
of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s reasoning,
calling it “a very clear and satisfactory opinion.”212
The traverse of Deming’s appeal from his court-martial to the
Eighth Circuit and onto the Supreme Court is fascinating in that, like
Runkle, the appeal evolved from its original claims into a broader, if not
unintended, constitutional holding. Shortly after Deming began serving
his sentence at Fort Leavenworth, his counsel, John H. Atwood,
discovered that the court-martial was composed of regular Army officers
rather than militia and volunteer officers.213 Atwood argued to the Eighth
Circuit that the absence of militia officers violated Article 77 of the 1874
Articles of War.214 Secretary of War, Elihu Root, assigned Major Enoch
Crowder, the future Judge Advocate General and Provost Marshal of the
United States during World War I, to represent the Government.215 In
this instance, Crowder and the Government did not prevail; the Eighth
Circuit agreed with Atwood and determined that Deming’s court-martial
was devoid of jurisdiction.216 Moreover, the Court of Appeals reasoned
that since the beginning of the nation, there had been prohibitions
against regular Army officers sitting in judgment of volunteers and
militia soldiers, so Deming’s waiver resulting from his guilty plea was
not an issue of simple error, but rather, one of constitutional
magnitude.217
Crowder remained on the appeal, representing the United States
through to the Supreme Court.218 He argued that, because Congress had
211. Deming, 113 F. at 652 (quoting Runkle, 122 U.S. at 556).
212. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 53 (1902).
213. See McClaughry v. Deming, 113 F. 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1902).
214. See id.; WILLIAM E. CONNELLY, 3 A STANDARD HISTORY OF KANSAS AND KANSANS
1364 (1918). On Article 77 and the executive branch’s response, see Letter from Philander Knox,
U.S. Att’y Gen., to Elihu Root, U.S. Sec’y of War (Oct. 31, 1901) (on file with National Archives
and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.). Article 77 stated: “Officers of the Regular Army
shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces, except as
provided in Article 78.” 1 THE FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED 498 (William M. McKinney &
Charles C. Moore eds., 1903).
215. See Capt. Deming’s Appeal: Supreme Court Hears Argument in the Case of a Volunteer
Officer Convicted of Fraud, supra note 208; KASTENBERG, supra note 66, at 12, 14.
216. See Deming, 113 F. at 650-52.
217. See id. at 644.
218. Letter from Enoch Crowder, J. Advoc., U.S. Army, to George B. Davis, J. Advoc. Gen.,
U.S. Army (Feb. 13, 1902) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C.); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 53 (1902). In regard to the issue of
Deming’s waiver of the right to militia and the Eighth Circuit not considering this a waiver of
appeal, Crowder penned to General Davis: “[T]he overwhelming weight of authority is that a
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not created a separate Articles of War for the militia or volunteers, but
rather required a court-martial composed of militia officers, Deming’s
appeal and the lower court’s decision was based on a technicality that, if
upheld, could erode the Commander-in-Chief’s fullest authority over the
Army.219 Moreover, Crowder cautioned that if the lower court’s ruling
were upheld, hundreds of court-martialed soldiers, including those from
the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, would have to
be freed from prison and restored to duty.220 The Court, in issuing
Deming, was apparently not persuaded by Crowder’s argument. Instead,
in an opinion authored by Justice Rufus Peckham, the justices
determined that a court-martial—as “a court of special and limited
jurisdiction”—could not have had jurisdiction over an accused
servicemember if the members appointed to the court-martial were
incompetent.221 Notably, the Court determined that regular Army
officers could not be considered competent to serve on the courts-martial
of militia or volunteers.222 Moreover, it should not be ignored that the
very category of officer most subject to the President’s orders—the
regular Army officer—could not, under law, be trusted to adjudge a
volunteer or militia member.223 In essence, Deming represents a
verdict rendered by incompetent juror or jurors is not void, but voidable only, and that unless timely
challenge or objection is resorted to the incompetency is held to be waived.” Letter from Enoch
Crowder to George B. Davis, supra.
219. Letter from Enoch Crowder to George B. Davis, supra note 218.
220. See id. Crowder informed Davis that he argued in regard to the ability of the Army to
assign regular army officers to serve on courts-martial and that “unless this point can be made good,
all trials of volunteers of the army of 1898 by either regular or mixed courts must fail.” Id. On
Crowder’s argument to the Court, see Capt. Deming’s Appeal: Supreme Court Hears Argument in
the Case of a Volunteer Officer Convicted of Fraud, supra note 208. Crowder quietly complained to
Judge Advocate General Davis that the three judges on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
were prejudiced against the government’s position because each of the judges had served as
volunteers in the Union Army during the Civil War. Letter from Enoch Crowder to George B.
Davis, supra note 218. Crowder penned:
With the discussion limited to that proposition alone, I know of no case to more likely
turn upon the personal equation of the judges than this one. All three of the judges were
volunteer officers of the Civil War, and I wrote you how Caldwell interrupted my oral
argument with the remark that his observation was that the volunteers of 1861 detested
the regular army, and that, as nearly as he could determine, the feeling was cordially
reciprocated.
Id. Crowder apparently believed that because the three judges, Henry Clay Caldwell, Walter Henry
Sanborn, and Amos Madden Thayer, were volunteer officers rather than professional officers during
the Civil War, they were biased toward Deming, a fellow volunteer officer. Id. On Henry Clay
Caldwell’s Civil War service, see Richard S. Arnold & George C. Freeman III, Judge Henry Clay
Caldwell, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 317, 319-21 (2001). On Amos Thayer’s Civil War
service, see THE BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES 446 (Am. Biographical
Publ’g Co. 1901).
221. Deming, 186 U.S. at 63-64.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 57.
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significant restraint on presidential control over military justice, even
though Congress has, since this time, ended the court-martial distinction
between National Guard, Reserve, and Active forces.
C. Grafton v. United States
In 1907, the Court in Grafton v. United States224 determined that
the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy applied to
servicemembers insofar as a court-martial is a federal judicial trial and
once a servicemember has been prosecuted in a court-martial, another
federal tribunal is constitutionally barred from prosecuting the
servicemember for the same conduct.225 As in Deming and Runkle, the
legal history of Grafton provides further context to the limits of
presidential control over military justice beyond the decision itself.
Grafton’s transit to the Court pitted Solicitor General Henry Hoyt
against the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Hoyt, of course,
represented the United States and, impliedly, President Theodore
Roosevelt.226 Alongside John H. Atwood, Captain Clarence S. Nettles,
an acting judge advocate, represented Private Homer E. Grafton, the
respondent in the appeal.227
In reality, Nettles was not the only judge advocate to represent
Grafton, as Major John Hull, the judge advocate for the Philippine
Islands, and General George Breckenridge Davis, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army at the time, also impliedly sided with Grafton over
Roosevelt.228 This point should not be disregarded for two reasons. First,
advocates of the unitary executive theory, such as John Yoo and Greg
Sulmasy, have argued that judge advocates—like all commissioned
officers—owe their allegiance to the President and that since September
11, 2001, this has not occurred.229 Instead, well before the September
11th attacks, the transit of Grafton’s court-martial and appeal provides
224. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
225. Id. at 354-55. Grafton has been dispositive in the Court’s expansion of the single
sovereign doctrine in which a state cannot prosecute a defendant for the same offense if one of the
state’s municipalities has already done so. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970).
226. See Grafton, 206 U.S. at 336.
227. See id. at 334.
228. See Letter from John Hull, J. Advoc., U.S. Army, to George B. Davis, J. Advoc. Gen.,
U.S. Army (Apr. 5, 1906) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,
D.C.).
229. See, e.g., Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1842-44 (2007). Several
scholars, including writers that Sulmasy and Yoo quoted, have criticized their article. See, e.g.,
Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on Terror: A Response to
the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 623-25, 635 (2009);
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. INT’L AFFS., Winter 2008, at 146,
150-52.
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examples of judge advocates opposing a Commander-in-Chief while
acting with fidelity to the Constitution. Second, while Grafton was
primarily decided on the basis of whether double jeopardy applied to
different trials conducted within the domain of a single sovereign (in this
case the executive branch), it should not be missed that the President
would have possessed more expansive control over servicemembers if
the Court were to have decided Grafton’s appeal in opposite.
A more complete legal history of the decision provides further
context to the historic acceptance of limitations on the President’s
authority over military justice. On August 15, 1904, a general
court-martial convened at Camp Jossman, Guimaras to try Private
Homer E. Grafton.230 At the time of the court-martial, Grafton had
served in the Army for four years and had taken part in suppressing
insurrection on Samar three years earlier.231 Accused of murdering
Florentino Castro and Felix Villanueva, two Philippine civilians, on July
24 of that year, he pled not guilty.232 The Army specifically charged him
with shooting the two civilians without provocation and, he admitted to
firing his rifle but doing so out of self-defense and while on guard
duty.233 Corporal Jacob B. Skarr delivered perhaps the most compelling
evidence against Grafton. Skarr testified, over Grafton’s objection, that
Grafton had been ordered to leave his rifle with quartermaster sergeant,
but that he maintained his rifle for sentry duty, in Grafton’s words, “in
case of there being trouble of any kind on the road.”234 Grafton testified
in his own defense that while he was assigned to sentry duty on a
wooden pier, Castro and Villanueva “advanced rapidly” toward him with
one of them holding a knife.235 As a result, he believed his actions were
necessary in order to save himself.236 In addition to his own testimony,
he called his company sergeant who testified to what is now called a

230. Brief in Error to Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at 6, Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907) (No. 358).
231. See Transcript of Record at 33, Grafton, 206 U.S. 333 (No. 358).
232. Grafton, 206 U.S. at 341-42.
233. Id. Grafton’s charges were as follows:
Specification I. In that Private Homer E. Grafton, Company G, 12th Infantry, being a
sentry on post, did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously kill Florentino Castro, a
Philippino, by shooting him with a U.S. magazine rifle, caliber .30. This at Buena Vista
Landing, Guimaras, P.I., July 24th 1904. Specification II. In that Private Homer E.
Grafton, Company G, 12th Infantry, being a sentry on post, did unlawfully, willfully, and
feloniously kill Felix Villanueva, a Philippino, by shooting him with a U.S. magazine
rifle, caliber .30 This at Buena Vista Landing, Guimaras, P.I., July 24, 1904.
Id.
234. Transcript of Record at 26, Grafton, 206 U.S. 333 (No. 358). However, Skarr later
testified that he “did not attach any special significance to Grafton’s remarks.” Id. at 27.
235. Id. at 29.
236. Id. at 32.
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“good soldier defense.”237 Ultimately, the court-martial determined that
Grafton was not guilty of murder and had acted in self-defense.238
Apparently, Grafton’s acquittal offended the civil authorities, and
acting under the governor general’s orders, James Ross, the Supervisor
of Fiscal Affairs, and Ruperto Mantinola, a local prosecutor, charged
Grafton with the crime of “assassination” under the Philippine criminal
code.239 Ross argued to Judge Henry C. Bates, the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance, that assassination and Article 62 were not
duplicative, and therefore, a civil trial was not precluded by the
prohibition against double jeopardy.240 Judge Bates agreed, commenting,
“I think it is hardly the same offense. This is a complaint for
assassination. The proceedings by which he was tried . . . charge as an
offense for the breach of the 62nd Article of War.”241 However, there
was a larger question as to whether jeopardy prevented the civil
authorities in the Philippines from prosecuting Grafton for the deaths of
the two civilians because, unlike a state prosecution, the Philippine
criminal courts were federal in nature and were overseen by
presidentially-appointed federal representatives.242
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Grafton argued that:
(1) the Philippine criminal trial denied him the right to a jury trial as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; (2) that the Philippine courts did not
have jurisdiction to try soldiers who acted in the performance of their
duties; and (3) that double jeopardy prevented the federally-managed
civil courts from prosecuting him at all since a court-martial and the
Philippine courts were both federal tribunals.243 Grafton’s appeal to the
Court was supported by both Major Hull and Judge Advocate General
Davis against the Attorney General.244 Hull concluded to Davis a
237. Id. at 33. Sergeant Edward J. Little testified:
His character is excellent as a man and for knowing his duties as a soldier there is none
better in the regiment. He is a man of very few words, never gets excited, as I have
noticed in the company. I would further state that if I had a detail to go out on an
expedition of any kind, or anything serious, I would naturally pick out Private Grafton.
Id. Grafton also called Captain F.D. Wickham who testified Grafton’s character “was excellent as a
soldier.” Id. at 33-34. The “good soldier defense,” is essentially a character defense akin to
advancing a character of law-abidingness. See, e.g., United States v. Tipton, 34 M.J. 1153, 1156
(A.C.M.R. 1992).
238. Grafton, 206 U.S. at 342. On August 25, Brigadier General William H. Carter approved
the verdict and restored Grafton to his duties. Id.
239. Brief in Error to Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, supra note 230.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See Grafton, 206 U.S. at 354-55.
243. Brief in Error to Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, supra note 230; Grafton, 206
U.S. at 345.
244. Letter from John Hull to George B. Davis, supra note 228. Hull observed, “The
importance of this case to the Army, and its far reaching influence on the troops and the natives of
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promise that “no stone should be left unturned to secure justice for
Grafton.”245 In this respect, Hull and the Judge Advocate General argued
against not only the Justice Department, but also, by an arguable
implication, Roosevelt.
D. Scholars Have Misplaced the Role of Swaim and Executive Control
Executive control over military justice has been argued in
practically absolute terms, often through a mistakenly oversimplified
historic, if not anti-historic, lens. For instance, Professor Clinton
Rossiter, who captured the presidential oversight of courts-martial and
other aspects of military discipline by calling the Commander-in-Chief
“the fountainhead of military justice,” declared that in Swaim, the Court
had practically eviscerated Runkle, and spoke, in approving terms, of the
inherent constitutional authority for a President to convene a court.246
Like Justice Alito, Rossiter missed the point that the Court took comfort
in the fact that the Senate had, on the eve of Swaim’s court-martial,
expressed its opinion that a President could convene a court-martial.247
Instead, Justice Alito, and before him, Rossiter, tended toward Thomas
Macaulay’s thesis that military law had to be both austere and kept from
the civil courts, lest the military be incorporated into civil government to
a degree that it becomes a threat to it.248
Rossiter’s treatment of Deming and Grafton, like Runkle, is
dismissive as to the opinions’ effects on limiting presidential authority.
He relegated Deming to two inconsequential footnotes and Grafton to
one.249 He focused some of his writing on preventing the civil courts
from reviewing courts-martial in contravention of the strict habeas test
and not on whether a President could upend due process in
these islands can not be over estimated.” Id. Hull was also critical of the Philippine Supreme Court,
writing:
I am sorry to see that Judge Tracey, in his decision, has seen fit to inject certain views of
the facts that are not borne out by the record. For instance, on page 4, he holds that
Grafton is a new comer and unacquainted with conditions, although he had served one
enlistment in the Islands, and Tracey had been here but a few days when the case was
heard.
Id.
245. Id.
246. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 108-09
(Expanded ed. 1976). In describing Swaim, Rossiter took the liberty of penning a soliloquy between
Swaim and Justice Shiras that is not found in the record. See id. at 107-08. Perhaps Rossiter
modeled his statements on Justice Felix Frankfurter’s soliloquy to the Court during their
deliberations over the fate of Nazi saboteurs in 1942. See 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF
THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 317 (2006).
247. See supra Part II.C.
248. See Margulies, supra note 44, at 331-32.
249. See ROSSITER, supra note 246, at 15 n.4, 104 n.75, 105 n.79.
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courts-martial.250 Moreover, his scholarship rests on the texts of judicial
decisions rather than on a more in-depth study of the legal history
underlying the cases, including the arguments advanced by counsel and
the important political and social forces contextualizing constitutional
and statutory interpretation.251 As a signal of the weakness in Rossiter’s
approach, in Deming, 1,600 soldiers were freed from confinement—a
point Rossiter never mentioned.252 Rossiter’s approach to merely
scratching the surface of legal history is a current practice among
advocates who apply the unitary executive theory to military justice.253
Simply, Rossiter and other advocates of broad, if not unfettered,
executive control, do not delve into the history of these decisions in their
work. Yet the legal history of Runkle, Deming, and Grafton provides
evidence that curbs presidential authority over servicemembers,
subjecting such authority to both constitutional due process constraints
and those imposed through Congress’ statutory intent.254
IV.

LEX NON SCRIPTA OF PRESIDENTIAL CONDUCT

Although the twentieth century—the era of “modern warfare”—
may provide the most poignant examples of presidential
non-interference with courts-martial during crisis periods such as World
War II and the Cold War, the examples of President George Washington
during one of the earliest military campaigns, and of President James
Madison during the War of 1812, might present the best starting point
for establishing a baseline for presidential conduct. For the purposes of
this Article, Washington’s conduct need only be briefly considered.
250. See id. at 111-12, 114.
251. See generally id.
252. CONNELLY, supra note 214, at 1364.
253. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
*2, Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) (No. 16-1423) [hereinafter Brief of Bamzai];
Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2173-74. Professor Bamzai posits that the original strict habeas test, as
articulated in Ex parte Vallandigham, militates against the federal judiciary taking a more expansive
jurisdiction as statutorily crafted by Congress in 1982. See Brief of Bamzai, supra, at *4 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1259); see also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1863). In citing to
both the majority opinion in Sprint Communications Co. v. APPC Services and Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Coleman v. Miller for the proposition that “history and tradition offer a meaningful
guide to the type of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider,” Bamzai failed to
present a meaningful historic argument. Brief of Bamzai, supra, at *11; see also Sprint Commc’ns
Co. v. APCC Servs. Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Indeed, Professor Bamzai presented no analysis of Martin v. Mott, the
seminal opinion on military justice and presidential authority over it, or Swaim, for that matter. Nor
did he mention Grafton or Deming. His one appreciable statement regarding Runkle was a bare
recognition that a President is required to act judicially in certain circumstances, but he failed to
note that a presidential omission to do so vested the courts with jurisdiction over specific
courts-martial. Brief of Bamzai, supra, at *28.
254. See supra Part III.A–C.
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Following the Army’s defeat at the Battle of the Wabash on November
4, 1791, Washington had the opportunity to subject General Arthur
St. Clair to public approbation or court-martial, but chose to do
neither.255 St. Clair sought a court of inquiry to clear his name and this
could have resulted in a court-martial.256 Clearly, the defeat was
troubling to the security of the nation and to the public’s confidence in
the military, and Congress, for the first time in history, investigated the
War Department.257 Washington, who could have turned St. Clair into a
scapegoat, publicly responded to an aide’s query: “General St. Clair
shall have justice. . . . I will hear him without prejudice, he shall have
full justice.”258
Fought between 1812 and 1815, the so-called War of 1812 was
hardly a United States military victory, and the United States did not
possess a unified polity toward the conflict with Great Britain.259
Federalists, particularly in the north, who were out of the White House
and in the minority in Congress since Thomas Jefferson defeated John
Adams for the presidency in 1800, opposed the war and argued that
Britain was far less of an enemy than Napoleonic France.260 In turn,
Republican loyalists to James Madison, who were supportive of the war,
accused Federalists of treason.261 Throughout the war, there were mass
desertions and refusals to enter into state militias.262 Near war’s end, the
Army court-martialed General William Hull for cowardice after he
surrendered his forces to the British and lost Detroit without first giving
battle.263 Perhaps because of the unpopularity of the war, Madison’s
255. See WILEY SWORD, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON’S INDIAN WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
OLD NORTHWEST, 1790-1795, at 201-02 (1985).
256. Id. at 202.
257. Id. at 202-03.
258. Id. at 201.
259. On the unpopularity and political dissension surrounding the War of 1812, see SEAN
WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 153-55 (2005)
(discussing the Federalist opposition to the war); ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN
AND HIS TIME 121-28 (1997) (discussing Daniel Webster and the Federalists’ attacks on President
James Madison’s war policies); C. EDWARD SKEEN, CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN THE WAR OF 1812, at
28-30 (1999) (noting that northern state militias, as guided by state governments, placed restrictions
on their duties, such as refusing to take offensive action against British forces, and only defended
their states from invasion).
260. See JAMES H. BROUSSARD, THE SOUTHERN FEDERALISTS: 1800-1816, at 160-64 (1978).
261. See id. at 160.
262. See ANTHONY J. YANIK, THE FALL AND RECAPTURE OF DETROIT IN THE WAR OF 1812: IN
DEFENSE OF WILLIAM HULL 96 (2011); SKEEN, supra note 259, at 29-30.
263. See YANIK, supra note 262, at 106, 112. Yanik notes that, in regard to Martin Van Buren
and another civilian attorney serving as judge advocates, “Having civilians in charge of a military
trial again was a departure from the norm.” Id. at 110. On General Hull’s view of his court-martial,
see generally, WILLIAM HULL, MEMOIRS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE NORTH WESTERN ARMY OF
THE UNITED STATES, A.D. 1812 (1824). Hull lamented that the American general he blamed as most
responsible for the defeat of his forces, General Dearborn, sat as the presiding officer on the
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administration needed a scapegoat and Hull served this purpose. 264
Madison had, in his role as Commander-in-Chief, selected Hull to
command the nation’s regular and militia forces on the northern
frontier.265
Political newspapers of the time, such as the Niles Weekly Register,
reported on the trial and questioned Hull’s loyalty to the nation, and
former President Thomas Jefferson openly accused Hull of
“treachery.”266 Evidencing the political nature of courts-martial, the
Secretary of the Army appointed Martin Van Buren, a civilian New
York State Legislator who had not taken part in the war, to serve as the
judge advocate for the court-martial.267 On March 26, 1814, the
court-martial determined that Hull was guilty and sentenced him to “be
shot to death,” but Madison, after approving the sentence and the
recommendation of some of the officers on the court-martial, determined
that because Hull had faithfully served in the Continental Army in the
Revolutionary War against Britain, the sentence would be set aside,
allowing Hull to retire.268 Thus, in the politically charged court-martial
of a general, Madison appears to have been reticent to openly proclaim
Hull’s guilt or demand a sentence to death, and, whether Madison
believed Hull had received a fair trial—something Hull did not
receive—he exercised leniency.
A. Polk, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Roosevelt: Pre-UCMJ Conduct
At the end of the war with Mexico, President James K. Polk
intruded into the potential court-martial of one of his political
supporters, General Gideon Johnson Pillow. 269 Commanding General of
court-martial. Id. at 13.
264. YANIK, supra note 262, at 104.
265. DANIEL S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, THE WAR OF 1812, at 59 (2002). The
Heilders’ note, “Hull’s surrender of Detroit did more than shatter U.S. confidence in the opening
weeks of the war; it squandered one of the best opportunities for the United States to win a
significant victory.” Id. at 60.
266. See Trial of General Hull, NILES WKLY. REG., May 7, 1814, at 154-62; see also TROY
BICKHAM, THE WEIGHT OF VENGEANCE: THE UNITED STATES, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, AND THE WAR
OF 1812, at 105 (2012). Bickham points out that western newspapers sympathetic to Madison, such
as the Missouri Gazette, accused Hull of Treason, as did former President Thomas Jefferson. Id.
267. DONALD B. COLE, MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 40-41
(1984).
268. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1665 (1862); REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF BRIG.
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL; COMMANDING THE NORTH-WESTERN ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES BY
A COURT MARTIAL HELD AT ALBANY ON MONDAY, 3D JANUARY, 1814, AND SUCCEEDING DAYS
119 (Eastburn, Kirk, & Co. 1844).
269. See ALLAN PESKIN, WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 198-200 (2003).
Pillow had also informed Polk of a fictitious bribery scheme from Antonio López de Santa Anna,
the commander of the Mexican Army, to Winfield Scott to end the war. Id. at 173-74; Ramon
Alcaraz, Santa Anna Did a Lot More than Kill Davy Crockett, STRAUSMEDIA (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:29
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the Army, Winfield Scott, accused Pillow of spreading falsehoods to the
point of conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman, and in turn,
Polk removed Scott from Mexico back to the United States.270 The
President also established a court of inquiry—akin to a grand jury—and
after stacking the inquiry with pro-Pillow officers, the inquiry
determined that Pillow’s exaggerations and conduct were not worthy of
a court-martial.271 However Polk may have manipulated the
courts-martial system to insulate a favorite general, he did not
undermine the fairness of a court-martial to the detriment of an accused
servicemember, nor did he act without conformity to the Articles of
War.
From November 27, 1862, through January 21, 1863, the Army
court-martialed General Fitz-John Porter for disobeying lawful orders
and misbehavior before the enemy at the Second Battle of Manassas.272
Porter had, in fact, used disparaging language toward General John
Pope, the commanding general at the battle.273 While Judge Advocate
General Holt’s conduct (as well as that of Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton) during and after the trial has come under question, at no time
did President Abraham Lincoln issue a public statement regarding the
trial to Porter’s detriment or demand the court-martial reach a specific
result.274 And, prior to his court-martial, Porter had published articles in
the New York World that were highly critical of Lincoln’s cabinet as well
as against other generals.275
PM), http://www.nypress.com/news/santa-anna-did-a-lot-more-than-kill-davy-crockett-LFNP10200
20910309109999. In his diary, Polk noted that both Nicholas Trist and Scott “seem to have entered
into a conspiracy to embarrass the government.” James K. Polk Papers: Series 1, Diaries, 1845-1849
(Jan. 24, 1848), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss36509.003_0010_0743/?st=gallery.
270. JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, AGENT OF DESTINY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL
WINFIELD SCOTT 314-17, 320 (1997); Roy P. Stonesifer, Jr., Gideon J. Pillow: A Study in Egotism,
25 TENN. HIST. Q. 340, 342-44 (1966).
271. See Stonesifer, supra note 270, at 344.
272. See KASTENBERG, supra note 66, at 86, 89; see also JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 528 (1988).
273. MCPHERSON, supra note 272, at 528.
274. See REVERDY JOHNSON, A REPLY TO THE REVIEW OF JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL HOLT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS, FINDINGS AND SENTENCE, OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL, IN THE CASE
OF MAJOR GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER, AND A VINDICATION OF THAT OFFICER 9, 55 (1863).
Senator Reverdy Johnson, a pro-Union democrat representing Maryland, served as Porter’s defense
counsel and later as a defense counsel in the military commissions trial of Mary Surratt. See
BERNARD C. STEINER, THE LIFE OF REVERDY JOHNSON 55, 115 (1914). He also was a pallbearer at
President Lincoln’s funeral. See id. at 115.
275. See, e.g., ETHAN S. RAFUSE, MCCLELLAN’S WAR: THE FAILURE OF MODERATION IN THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE UNION 342 (2005). Perhaps one of the most critical accounts of Lincoln was by
his former postmaster general, Montgomery Blair, who later argued that Lincoln had the duty to
appoint the officers to Porter’s court-martial but permitted Stanton to do so. See MONTGOMERY
BLAIR, POSTMASTER-GENERAL DURING PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S ADMINISTRATION TO MAJ.-GEN.
FITZ JOHN PORTER 1-2, 5-6 (1874). Porter’s chief defense counsel, Senator Reverdy Johnson, in
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Theodore Roosevelt, in 1902, publicly articulated his disgust with
the lenient court-martial sentence of General Jacob Hurd Smith, who had
been convicted of “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline,” and sentenced to an admonishment.276 Smith not only
oversaw the murder of Philippine civilians, he perjured himself in the
court-martial of a subordinate officer who was court-martialed for
commanding the actual killings.277 However, under the Articles of War
and military procedures at the time, either the President or
then-Secretary of War Elihu Root could have acted as Arthur had with
Swaim and sought a more severe sentence, but chose not to do so. 278
Moreover, since the sentence for Smith was an admonishment, it is
arguable that Roosevelt merely carried out the court-martial sentence in
his public comments.
In 1938, retired General George Van Horn Moseley openly accused
President Franklin Roosevelt of being a communist and claimed that the
President was unfit to serve as Commander-in-Chief.279 Roosevelt opted
not to recall Moseley to active duty for a court-martial.280 One year after
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Moseley wrote to former President
Herbert Hoover that Roosevelt’s policies were responsible for the war
with Japan.281 Toward the end of the war, Moseley argued to Senator
Homer Ferguson of Michigan that Roosevelt was responsible for the
attack at Pearl Harbor.282 In 1942, Roosevelt asked Supreme Court
evidencing Lincoln’s hands-off approach to the Porter trial, complained that “[t]he President’s time,
however, was perhaps so engrossed by matters which he supposed to be of more pressing national
moment” that he was unable to give the court-martial the attention it merited. See JOHNSON, supra
note 274, at 8-9.
276. President Retires Gen. Jacob H. Smith: Philippine Officer Reprimanded for “Kill and
Burn” Order, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1902, at 1.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Moseley Aims to Save Nation: Replies to Charge He Heads Un-American
Group, N.Y. SUN, May 20, 1939, at 2; FRANCIS MACDONNELL, INSIDIOUS FOES: THE AXIS FIFTH
COLUMN AND THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT 41 (1995).
280. See Court Martial of Mosely for Insubordination Sought, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY,
June 5, 1939, at 5.
281. See Letter from George Van Horn Moseley, Gen., U.S. Army, to Herbert Hoover (Dec.
18, 1942). In his letter, Moseley said:
Mr. Roosevelt tells us that there will be 10,000,000 men in our fighting forces—the
cream of American manpower. While they are away from home—out of the country—
are we going to allow the home country to be taken over by a lot of un-Americans,
communists and Jews? That is actually taking place today. The evidence of this trend is
voluminous and very clear.
Id. Moseley openly reiterated his allegations to Republican senators. See, e.g., Letter from George
Van Horn Moseley, Gen., U.S. Army, to Homer Ferguson, U.S. Senator (Dec. 26, 1945). Hoover
disagreed with Moseley. See Letter from Herbert Hoover to George Van Horn Moseley, Gen., U.S.
Army (Dec. 20, 1942).
282. See, e.g., Letter from George Van Horn Moseley to Homer Ferguson, supra note 281.
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Justice Owen Roberts to lead an investigation into the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor.283 While Roberts’s agreement to do so brings forth
interesting questions of judicial ethics and the erosion of the important
separation of powers doctrine, his presence on a board of critical
national security importance also gave confidence to the public that
Roosevelt would be unable to direct the investigation to a specific
result.284 After all, Roberts was not appointed to the Court by Roosevelt;
it was Hoover who did so.285
B. Truman and Eisenhower: Presidential Conduct Under the UCMJ
President Harry S. Truman, like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin
Roosevelt, evidenced particular caution to avoid influencing military
proceedings that had the potential to become politically or socially
important. Truman was President during the well-publicized
court-martial of Major General Robert Grow, who was accused of
negligently permitting classified information to be captured by Soviet
intelligence.286 General Grow’s court-martial was well reported in the
press, and Truman received public pressure over the military’s handling
of the trial.287 The historic record contains no statements from Truman
regarding the court-martial, although in response to a reporter’s
questions on the political activities of generals, Truman responded: “I
have no comment. The Army is handling that.” 288 Grow’s court-martial,
conducted at the height of the Korean War, was not the only publicized
military proceeding Truman responded to without demanding a specified
outcome.
In early August 1951, ninety United States Military Academy
(“USMA”) cadets were expelled after being accused of cheating on

283. See John J. McCloy, Owen J. Roberts’ Extra Curiam Activities, 104 U. PENN. L. REV.
350, 350, 352 (1955).
284. That Roberts dissented in Korematsu v. United States evidences that he was likely
independent in assessing Roosevelt’s wartime decisions. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
225-33 (Roberts J., dissenting). Roosevelt was not alone in appointing justices to serve on military
investigations. In 1942, the Governor General of Canada appointed Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff of
the Supreme Court of Canada to lead an investigation into the defeat of Canadian forces against the
Japanese in Hong Kong. See WAR AND DIPLOMACY ACROSS THE PACIFIC, 1919-1952, at 158-59 (A.
Hamish Ion & Barry D. Hunt eds., 1988). Duff, like Roberts, would lend credence to the public
belief in the fairness of the investigation.
285. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 383 (Melvin I.
Urofsky ed., 1994).
286. GEORGE F. HOFMANN, COLD WAR CASUALTY: THE COURT-MARTIAL OF MAJOR
GENERAL ROBERT W. GROW 7-9 (1993).
287. Id. at 43-50. For an example of the front-page reporting on the trial, see Grow
Court-Martial Is Started in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1952, at 30.
288. The President’s News Conference of June 12, 1952, 4 PUB. PAPERS 416 (June 12, 1952).
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exams.289 The cheating scandal—in violation of the West Point honor
code—garnered front page headlines.290 Over a third of the expelled
cadets were football players, leading to further media and national
interest in the scandal.291 Although the cadets were not yet
commissioned officers, they were subject to the recently enacted
UCMJ.292 Truman’s reaction to the scandal was not to press for a
court-martial prosecution, but rather to affix blame on the prominence of
college football as a lure for academically underperforming students to
cheat.293 Indeed, his Military Aide, General Harry Vaughan, believed
that to diffuse public calls for a court-martial, Truman should simply
hold the cadets back one year.294 Truman did not follow Vaughan’s
advice and instead appointed Judge Learned Hand to lead an
investigation into the cadets who were accused of cheating.295 Based on
289. See STEVEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF WEST POINT 318
(Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 1999) (1966).
290. Id.; see, e.g., West Point Ousts 90 Cadets for Cheating in Classroom; Football Players
Involved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1951, at 1.
291. See Stephen H. Norwood, Scandals and Controversies in Football, in TOUCHDOWN: AN
AMERICAN OBSESSION 59, 69-70 (Gerald R. Gems & Gertrud Pfister eds., 2019). According to
Norwood, based on a September 1951 Gallup Poll, more Americans knew of the West Point
Football cheating scandal than of the Senate’s hearings on Douglas MacArthur’s conduct in Korea
and subsequent dismissal. Id. at 70.
292. See, e.g., United States v. Ellman, 25 C.M.R. 588, 591 (A.B.R. 1958).
However,
the
military must afford a cadet due process before an administrative board resulting in expulsion.
Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1972). In Hagopian, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit determined that while the USMA’s system of cadet demerits was sound, the
discharge process utilizing demerits failed administrative due process. Id. at 210-12.
293. See Letter from Harry S. Truman, U.S. President, to Mrs. Charles R. Howard (Aug. 17,
1951). Truman wrote to Howard: “It is my opinion that the commercializing of football and the
extra curricula and things these young men had to do brought about the situation. There is nothing I
can do about what is past but I am taking steps to cure the situation for the future.” Id. However, as
a biography of legendary football coach, Vince Lombardi—who began his coaching career at the
USMA before moving to other coaching positions and ending with the Green Bay Packers—notes,
Republican congressional opponents of Truman blamed the Truman administration for the scandal
and claimed the athletes were “scapegoats.” DAVID MARANISS, WHEN PRIDE STILL MATTERED: A
LIFE OF VINCE LOMBARDI 133 (1999). For a background on Lombardi’s career, see generally id.
294. See Memorandum for the President from Harry H. Vaughan, Mil. Aid to the U.S.
President, to Harry Truman, U.S. President (Aug. 7, 1951). Vaughan advised Truman that:
The ninety men who are to be dismissed have undoubtedly broken the law and should be
penalized but there are several other matters which should be considered. These men
have been caught, or have confessed, and it is entirely possible that there are a hundred
other men who are equally guilty and have not confessed. Also, there are hundreds who
have done exactly as these men have done but have been permitted to graduate and given
commissions in the United States Army. Would it not be possible to serve the same
purpose by turning all these men back one year rather than dismissing them? This, of
course, might not meet with the approval of the Superintendent of the Academy or the
Chief of Staff, but it is one solution and I believe worth considering.
Id.
295. On the idea for an investigation headed by a judge, see Memorandum for the President
from Robert L. Dennison, Aide to the U.S. President, to Harry Truman, U.S. President (Aug. 9,
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Judge Hand’s advice, and with Truman’s approval, the investigation
resulted in over eighty administrative dismissals, although some of the
dismissed cadets later obtained military commissions from other sources
and served in the Vietnam Conflict.296
On May 23, 1956, during a news conference, a reporter asked
President Dwight D. Eisenhower a question on the persistent infighting
between the service branches over funding and whether inter-service
rivalry eroded discipline.297 Broadening his answer beyond inter-service
rivalry, Eisenhower responded, “[T]he day that discipline disappears
from our forces, we will have no forces, and we would be foolish to put
a nickel into them.”298 One year earlier, Eisenhower was presented with
a public outcry demanding that the so-called “turncoat” prisoners of war
from the Korean War be court-martialed.299 Following the end of the
Korean War, thousands of allied soldiers who were held as prisoners by
the People’s Republic of China and North Korea were repatriated, and a
small number were accused of collaborating with the enemy at the
expense of loyal prisoners of war.300 A smaller number of United States
service members initially refused repatriation after being accused of
collaboration, but returned to the United States after the formal prisoner
of war exchanges ceased.301

1951). An advisor to Truman, Dennison recommended “corrective measures to enable that school to
pursue with optimum effect its primary objective of developing career officers. Such a commission
might include a Supreme Court Justice . . . .” Id.; see also MARANISS, supra note 293, at 126-27.
296. See MARANISS, supra note 293, at 127, 132. Although judges’ extra-judicial duties on
behalf of the executive branch have come into question, Judge Hand’s appointment undoubtedly
reduced congressional criticism of Truman’s response since Truman followed the investigation’s
recommendations. On the conclusion of the investigation, see AMBROSE, supra note 289, at 318.
297. The President’s News Conference of May 23, 1956, 7 PUB. PAPERS 511, 513-14 (May 23,
1956).
298. Id. Eisenhower added:
Now, there comes a place in the military hierarchy where someone must make a
decision, and that decision must stick. The President, constitutionally, is the
Commander[-]in[-]Chief, and what he decides to do in these things, in the form and the
way that you arm and organize and command your forces, must be carried out.
Id. at 514.
299. See CHRISTINE KNAUER, LET US FIGHT AS FREE MEN: BLACK SOLDIERS AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 213-14 (2014).
300. Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Disloyalty Among “Men in Arms”: Korean War POWs at
Court-Martial, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1640, 1642-43 (2004). Professor Hillman writes, in assessing
among the many factors that led to courts-martial: “The court-martialed POWs became symbols of
the weakness and disloyalty that military and civilian leaders felt obliged to purge from the ranks of
the Cold War armed forces.” Id. at 1631-32. For one example of an actual court-martial, see United
States v. Dickenson, 6 C.M.A. 438 (1955). Among the various charges referred to the court-martial
were Article 104, “Aiding the enemy” and Article 105, “Misconduct as a prisoner” of the UCMJ. Id.
at 447, 449; see also United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 465, 507 (A.B.R. 1955).
301. SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, COLD WAR CAPTIVES: IMPRISONMENT, ESCAPE, AND
BRAINWASHING 218-20 (2009).
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Newspaper headlines from 1953 through 1955 illustrate that the
weight of public sentiment—including a number of congressmen—
assessed these prisoners of war as criminals deserving of courts-martial,
and the public, as well as members of Congress, were further angered to
learn that in some cases, the military had lost jurisdiction to do so.302 The
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, in determining
that three of the former prisoners of war were entitled to backpay, began
its opinion with the following statement: “The petitioners were enlisted
men in the United States Army who were captured during the hostilities
in Korea in 1950 and 1951. In the prison camps to which they were
taken they behaved with utter disloyalty to their comrades and to their
country.”303 Yet Eisenhower, perhaps because of his extensive military
service and rectitude for limiting the powers of his office, decided to
refer to the so-called “turncoat” prisoners in softer, biblical terms such as
“prodigal sons” and “lost sheep.”304
C. Nixon: The Court-Martial of Lieutenant William Calley
On December 9, 1969, in response to a reporter’s question
regarding the My Lai massacre, President Richard Milhous Nixon
conceded that a “massacre” had occurred and then stated: “That’s why
I’m going to do everything . . . to see that all the facts in this incident are
brought to light, and that those who are charged, if they are found guilty,
are punished.”305 Nixon did not name Lieutenant William Calley in this
statement, and he later counseled caution against speaking of Calley’s
guilt.306 On November 26, 1969, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor
lobbied the House of Representatives against demanding trials or
making public statements that could prejudice the over one dozen
courts-martial the Army contemplated for the massacre.307
302. Adam J. Zweiback, The 21 “Turncoat G.I.s”: Nonrepatriations and the Political Culture
of the Korean War, 60 HISTORIAN 345, 346-47, 350-53 (1998).
303. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 394 (1961). While Justice Stewart’s opinion was
likely a sincere encapsulation of the conduct and character of the three former prisoners of war, this
type of editorializing might be unhealthy for assuring the public that the Court is impartial in its
judgments.
304. Zweiback, supra note 302, at 353.
305. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 674 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
306. See id. at 676.
307. Id. at 663. It should not be interpreted from this Article that the author believes Nixon
operated solely with the interest of a fair trial for Calley. For instance, Daniel Moynihan, later a
Democratic senator, while serving as counsel to Nixon, advised Nixon to characterize the massacre
as part of a war of “liberal anti-communism.” See Memorandum from Daniel P. Moynihan, Advisor
to U.S. President, to Richard Nixon, U.S. President (Nov. 25, 1969) (on file with the Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum). National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, advised that a
court-martial of the participants, if properly conducted, would cause Senator Charles Goodell to
“abandon his plans for a Senate investigation.” Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Nat’l
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On April 1, 1971, in the midst of the Calley court-martial, White
House Counsel John Dean advised Nixon to refrain from taking action
before the Army Court of Military Review and the convening authority
had acted on Calley’s conviction.308 Among the reasons Dean listed for
refraining from presidential action was Article 37. Dean warned, “Any
Presidential statement about the specifics of this case would be subject
to criticism as an exertion of command influence.”309 Although Nixon
later granted Calley relief in the sense that he ordered Calley into house
arrest, he refrained from making public comments that had the potential
to affect the military appeal process either to the detriment of Calley or
the prosecution.310 In comparison, in 1970, Nixon publicly commented
on his belief of Charles Manson’s guilt in a pending California murder
trial.311 However, White House Press Secretary Ronald Zeigler quickly
disavowed any presidential intent to influence the jury.312 When
Sec. Advisor, to H.R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff (Nov. 21, 1969) (on file with the
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum). Finally, on the eve of Calley’s trial, Nixon
obtained the opinions of loyal congressmen as to how the administration should proceed with the
court-martial in order to limit criticism. See Memorandum from Dick Cook, Special Assistant to the
U.S. President, to John Ehrlichman, Counsel to U.S. President (Apr. 7, 1971) (on file with the
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum).
308. See Memorandum from John Dean, Counsel to U.S. President, to John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to U.S. President, & H. R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff (Apr. 1, 1971) (on file
with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum).
309. Id. While Dean did not conclude that a President was bound by Article 37, he cautioned
that presidential statements that could be taken as a directive to the military chain-of-command
involved in the Calley court-martial “would run counter to the spirit of the prohibition of command
influence.” See id.
310. See Ian Shapira, He Was America’s Most Notorious War Criminal, but Nixon Helped Him
Anyway, WASH. POST (May 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05
/25/he-was-americas-most-notorious-war-criminal-nixon-helped-him-anyway. On December 8,
1970, in response to a reporter’s question, Nixon conceded that a “massacre” had occurred, and then
stated: “That’s why I’m going to do everything . . . to see that all the facts in this incident are
brought to light and that those who are charged, if they are found guilty, are punished.” Calley, 382
F. Supp. at 674. On April 16, 1971, Nixon stated the following in a press conference, in response to
a question predicated on the prosecutor claiming he had undermined military justice by not
requiring Calley to be imprisoned: “Captain Daniel is a fine officer. And, incidentally, the six
members of that court had very distinguished military records. Five of the six, as you know, Mr.
Risher, had served with distinction in Vietnam.” Panel Interview at the Annual Convention of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, 2 PUB. PAPERS 537 (Apr. 16, 1971). On April 29, 1971, in
response to another press conference question on why he intervened in the Calley case, Nixon
responded:
Well, Mr. Jarriel, to comment upon the Calley case, on its merits, at a time when it is up
for appeal would not be a proper thing for me to do, because, as you know, I have
indicated that I would review the case at an appropriate time in my capacity as the final
reviewing officer.
The President’s News Conference of April 29, 1971, 2 PUB. PAPERS 596 (Apr. 29, 1971).
311. Ken W. Clawson, Nixon ‘Slips,’ Refers to Manson as Guilty: Criticizes Coverage of Trial,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1970, at A1.
312. See id.
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juxtaposing Nixon’s conduct toward Calley with his statements on
Manson, it highlights a degree of presidential caution over influencing
the military justice system.
D. The Conduct of President Trump and the Decay of Lex Non Scripta
The last three presidential administrations have, with increasing
severity, ignored the lex non scripta examples of their predecessors. In
2004, President George W. Bush commented on servicemembers
accused of criminality in the Abu Ghraib scandal, prior to their
courts-martial, as not representing the values of the United States armed
forces.313 In 2013, President Barack Obama publicly called for
dishonorable discharges for servicemembers convicted of sexual assault
offenses, prompting then-Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel to instruct
all servicemembers that while serving on courts-martial, they had the
duty to fairly and impartially assess evidence presented at trial to the
exclusion of external pressures.314
As noted in Part I, during the 2016 presidential campaign and after,
candidate, and eventual president, Donald Trump, articulated often false
and misleading comments about Robert Bowe Bergdahl.315 On October
17, 2017, Trump used the term “traitor” to characterize Bergdahl. 316
Trump’s statement was made before a military judge issued a
sentence.317 After Bergdahl was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge,
without jail time, Trump cast aspersions on the sentence.318 Even as
Bergdahl’s case was advancing through the appellate process, Trump
publicly attacked the verdict.319 It is a reasonable assumption that, in
addition to seeking to become elected, as well as maintaining the energy
313. Just a Few Bad Apples?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2005), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2005/01/20/just-a-few-bad-apples (quoting President George W. Bush, who said that “[t]he
‘disgraceful conduct’ had been the work of ‘a few bad apples’ who would be brought to justice”).
314. Jennifer Steinhauer, Hagel Tries to Blunt Effect of Obama Words on Sex Assault Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A14.
315. For a small sampling of President Trump’s comments, see, for example, Richard A.
Oppel, Jr., Documents Show Army Initially Pursued Softer Course on Bergdahl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2016, at A11; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bergdahl Is Spared Prison, to President’s Chagrin, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2017, at A1.
316. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Soldier Called “Traitor” by Trump Pleads Guilty to Desertion and
Endangering, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017, at A10.
317. See id.
318. See Meghan Keneally, President Trump Slams Bowe Bergdahl’s Sentence: ‘Complete
Disgrace’, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-trumpbowe-bergdahl/story?id=50912155; Daniella Diaz, Trump Slams Bergdahl Decision: ‘Complete and
Total Disgrace’, CNN (Nov. 3, 2017, 4:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/03/politics/donaldtrump-bowe-bergdahl-twitter/index.html.
319. Trump Rails Against Bowe Bergdahl and Chelsea Manning, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019,
3:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-rails-against-bowe-bergdahl-andchelsea-manning/2019/11/25/5b5b52ed-8446-48f9-b7af-1f34547eb614_video.html.
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of his supporters to a cause, Trump did, in fact, seek to maximize
Bergdahl’s punishment through influencing the court-martial.
On July 16, 2019, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals determined
in United States v. Bergdahl,320 that while “there was some evidence of
unlawful command influence adduced at trial and in the post-trial
process,” the Government had met its burden of proof to “demonstrate
that an objective disinterested observer would not harbor a significant
doubt as to the fairness of the proceedings.”321 At his court-martial,
Bergdahl had opted for a court-martial by a military judge, rather than
by a panel, but only made the selection for a bench trial because Trump
had made a fair trial by a panel an impossibility. 322 Unfortunately, the
two judges in the majority delivered a paltry legal analysis, stating that
“[i]ncendiary remarks by private citizens, even influential ones, do not
constitute evidence of [unlawful command influence],” without
acknowledging that the President is also the Commander-in-Chief,
imbued with the great powers that title carries.323
Government appellate counsel argued that the President could only
have committed unlawful command influence when serving as a
convening authority and then only under the Rules for Courts-Martial
(“RCM”).324 RCM 104(a)(1) carries language similar to Article 37.325
The two judges in the majority determined that Article 37 did not apply
to the President, nor, by implication, to civilian officers in the military
establishment, but rather, the RCM does.326 The distinction between the
320. 79 M.J. 512 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2019).
321. Id. at 517. In addition to alleging that Trump committed unlawful command influence,
Bergdahl also alleged Senator John McCain did as well. See id. at 521. While Senator McCain
served as chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and had persuasive ability over the
promotion of officers and the allocation of expenditures, Article 37 does not mention the legislative
branch either directly or by implication. See id. Bergdahl’s argument on expanding the prohibition
to Congress, while it may be meritorious, is not addressed in this Article. See id. at 522.
322. See Jonathan Drew, Bergdahl Chooses to Have Trial Heard by Judge, Not Jury, ARMY
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/08/21/bergdahlchooses-to-have-trial- heard-by-judge-not-jury.
323. Bergdahl, 79 M.J. at 523.
324. Id. at 524-25.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 525. Rules for Courts-Martial 104(a)(1) states, in pertinent part:
(a) General prohibitions.
(1) Convening authorities and commanders. No convening authority or commander may
censure, reprimand, or admonish a court-martial or other military tribunal or any
member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence
adjudged by the court-martial or tribunal, or with respect to any other exercise of the
functions of the court-martial or tribunal or such persons in the conduct of the
proceedings.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 104(a)(1) (2019); see also Bergdahl, 79
M.J. at 525. The Army Court, in citing to the applicability of this rule, did not note that on March 1,
2018, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13825, reaffirming the rule’s existence. This
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RCM and Article 37 is important for two reasons. First, the Army Court
acknowledged that while Article 37 applies to the convening authority
who referred the charges against Bergdahl to trial by court-martial, the
RCM applies to all convening authorities.327 Second, the RCM are rules
promulgated by the President, and the UCMJ is law.328 There is an
important legal, if not political, difference between violating an
administrative rule and violating the law, and the Army Court’s decision
places the President’s conduct in the lesser category of egregiousness.
Such a position is at odds with the weight of military law presented in
this Article.
It should be noted that the Army Court possesses, in contrast to the
federal appellate courts, unusual fact-finding authorities,329 but it did not
exercise such authorities in this case. The three judges, all subject to the
President’s orders, could have sought a statement of retraction or
assurance from the President that no member would be adversely
affected if the case were overturned or the sentence reassessed, such as
had occurred with Secretary of Defense Hagel. The court could have
also issued a cautionary statement against further intrusions into the
military justice system, but it did not do so.
On August 27, 2020, the CAAF issued its decision in United States
v. Bergdahl.330 All five of the judges agreed that a President is not
shielded from the prohibition against unlawful command influence.331
The majority also applied this analysis to Senator John McCain, a
decorated military retiree who publicly insisted on greater punishment
for Bergdahl.332 However, Judge Kevin Ohlson and Senior Judge
Margaret Ryan determined that while Trump had committed apparent
unlawful command influence under RCM 104(a)(1), a neutral observer
would conclude that the court-martial was untainted by it because there
was no “intolerable strain on the Military Justice System.” 333 In his
concurrence, Judge Gregory Maggs agreed with the majority that under
reaffirmation evidences that the administration knew of the rule’s existence as well as the
requirement that it follow it.
327. Bergdahl, 79 M.J. at 525.
328. See 10 U.S.C. § 836. In addition to the majority’s deficient analysis of the law, it failed to
note that the President is required to comply with his own rules. See United States v. McDonald, 55
M.J. 173, 177 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
329. 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1); see also United States v. Smith, 39 M.J. 448, 451 (C.M.A. 1994);
United States v. Tyler, 34 M.J. 293, 295 (C.M.A. 1992). The Supreme Court has upheld the
authority of the service courts of appeal to reassess sentences which the appellate courts believe to
be unjust without sending the new offenses back to the trial level. See Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
569, 579-80 (1957).
330. 80 M.J. 230 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
331. Id. at 234.
332. Id. at 234-35. However, it should be noted that this Article is not concerned with the
conduct of the legislative branch.
333. Id. at 239.
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certain conditions, both RCM 104 and Article 37 apply to the President,
but he disagreed that Trump committed unlawful command influence
because he was not the convening authority in Bergdahl’s
court-martial.334 Judge Maggs’s strict reading of both Article 37 and
RCM 104 ignore the military legal history underlying the prohibition as
well as the long-time constitutional and pre-constitutional limitations on
presidential conduct over military justice.
Chief Judge Scott W. Stucky concurred with the majority but
argued that the President’s conduct created an intolerable strain on the
military and, therefore, the only appropriate remedy was a dismissal with
prejudice.335 Finally, Judge John E. Sparks concurred with the majority,
but, like Judge Stucky, he urged that charges against Bergdahl be
dismissed with prejudice.336 Unlike the other judges, Judge Sparks
recognized the vast powers of a President, but he, too, failed to juxtapose
those powers against the framers’ fears of a standing army.
There are other noteworthy aspects of the decision. The
Government’s appellate lawyers never noted in their written briefs to the
Court that the President is the Commander-in-Chief vested with
enormous control over the military; instead, with the exception of a scant
argument that Trump did not adversely impact any officer’s career
through the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority, they
presented the President as a normal citizen and not an elected official in
command of the armed forces with the requirement to faithfully execute
the laws of the country. After the CAAF released this decision, the
original prosecutor in the case published an opinion piece in The
Washington Post in which he decried Trump’s conduct, including
outright lies about Bergdahl, and their effect on the trial.337 The
prosecutor did not claim that Trump had committed unlawful command
influence, but he conceded that the President vocally conveyed several
lies which were detrimental to Bergdahl.338 It remains to be seen whether
334. Id. at 251-53 (Maggs, J., concurring). Judge Maggs has approached this issue without
regard to the power of the President, and at no time does he note that the President is also the
Commander-in-Chief over the armed forces. Id.
335. Id. at 244-45 (Stucky, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
336. Id. at 246-48 (Sparks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
337. Justin Oshana, Opinion, I Led the Prosecution Against Bowe Bergdahl. Trump Made My
Job Much Harder, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio
ns/2020/08/31/i-led-prosecution-against-bowe-bergdahl-trump-made-my-job-much-harder.
338. Id. It should be noted that Bergdahl’s defense counsel discovered that the military trial
judge, Colonel Jeffrey Nance, failed to disclose that he sought a position as an immigration judge
and used his ruling in Bergdahl as a writing sample. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Error Coram
Nobis at 3, Bergdahl v. United States, No. ARMY MISC 20200588 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 23,
2020). The Army Court of Criminal Appeals has not issued a ruling at the time of this Article’s
publication. However, Judge Nance’s omission in failing to disclose that he sought a federal
administrative judicial position with the Trump administration at the time he issued a ruling
upholding Trump’s authority to court-martial Bergdahl is troubling. On the requirements of military
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the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in this case, or whether other
avenues will make clear that there are limitations to presidential conduct
over courts-martial.
V.

CONCLUSION

Due process in courts-martial is governed by the unique regime of
law as applied to the necessities of military service and the national
defense.339 Unfortunately, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals’ allusion
to President Trump as an influential citizen is nothing more than a gross
understatement of the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief. While
it is true, as Professor Richard Neustadt once penned, that the power of
the President is the power to persuade, this statement is inapplicable
when the President serves as the Commander-in-Chief.340 Former
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, in his defense of Fitz-John
Porter also articulated a sad truism that is readily applicable to Trump’s
treatment of military justice: “It is no new thing to sacrifice a soldier to
serve a political turn.”341 By his conduct, Trump has expanded
Commander-in-Chief authorities over military justice into a monarchal
trajectory.
Perhaps supporters of Trump’s conduct regarding military justice,
and the appellate counsel who argued to uphold Bergdahl’s conviction
and sentence—if not the President himself—might disagree with the
parallel between his treatment of Bergdahl and that of Arthur’s toward a
court-martialed general. Yet the parallel is all the more real, since
neither Trump nor Arthur served in the military—indeed, both used the
national conscription laws to be exempted from wartime service—and
both took an extreme view of their authority over military justice in the
courts-martial of servicemembers they believed did not deserve fair
treatment.342 Both presidents abandoned the model of rectitude
developed through the examples of Presidents Washington and Lincoln.
In President Trump’s case, the examples of Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and even Nixon have also been disregarded. Thus, for the
second time in history, presidential conduct designed to undermine the
right to a fair trial through coercive influence has occurred. And, unlike
in Arthur’s time, when the Regular Army’s numbers were quite small,
trial judges to disclose, see In re Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
339. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976).
340. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 30 (First Free Press Paperback ed. 1991)
(1990).
341. BLAIR, supra note 275, at 6.
342. On Arthur’s purchase of a substitute to serve in the Union Army in his place, see JAMES
M. VOLO, A HISTORY OF WAR RESISTANCE IN AMERICA 240 (2010).
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the current administration, which commands an enormous military, has
crossed over into the very behavior that early presidents avoided and
nascent democracies saw as a threat. Regardless of whether the President
repeats his conduct in Bergdahl’s case or treats war-crimes as something
less serious than to be desired, or whether Congress fails to include the
civilian chain-of-command in Article 37 in the future or if the courts
adjudicating Bergdahl’s appeal refuse to find that presidential unlawful
command influence constitutes more than a danger to the fair trial
aspects of courts-martial, a future President will be enabled to use the
military to ends feared most at the nation’s beginning: a tyranny of the
executive.

